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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SECURITY WORK WITHIN ARMY DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 11, Nov 80
pp 1-7

[Unattributed article: "The New Stage of the Revolution and the Task of Protecting the People's Armed Forces"]

[Text] The realities of the many years of the revolution and the revolutionary war in our country have shown that every reactionary power, from the French and U.S. colonialist imperialists to the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, always consider spy warfare and psychological warfare to be a national policy, to be a basic measure supporting their scheme of aggression. Our people's armed forces, which are the nucleus of the people's war and the national defense system, are always one of the targets of the spy warfare and sabotage of the enemy. By means of many sophisticated and crafty tricks, they constantly carry out intense activities designed to uncover military secrets, sabotage us politically, ideologically and organisationally and try to sabotage our material-technical bases in a vain attempt to cause our armed forces to lose their fighting strength and be unable to carry out the political and military tasks assigned by the party and the people. For this reason, improving security work and raising revolutionary vigilance within the armed forces are always an important task, one that must be thoroughly carried out in the process of performing every task in every field of work and under all circumstances of combat and the buildup of the armed forces, on the frontlines as well as in the rear and at agencies as well as units, especially at turning points of the revolution and at times when the situation undergoes complex changes.

The U.S. imperialists are still the basic, long-range enemy of our country's revolution; however, the reactionary clique within Beijing ruling circles has become the immediate and dangerous enemy of our people. Although they have continuously been defeated, especially in the two wars of aggression against our country on the southwestern border and the northern border, they have not abandoned their scheme and are making every effort to weaken and annex our country. They are collaborating with the imperialist forces, primarily the U.S. imperialists, in order to sabotage us in every area: economically, politically, militarily, diplomatically and so forth; they are keeping the situation tense and making frantic preparations for launching a large-scale war of aggression when conditions exist. Unable to commit armed aggression, they have attached special importance to intensifying the spy war and psychological war, concentrating on the primary targets of undermining the line, policies and leadership organisation of our party and state, sabotaging the fighting strength of the people's armed forces and people's public security force and

using slander and distortion in a vain attempt to reduce the prestige of the leaders of the party, state and army. They also look for ways to place persons, including persons who call themselves anti-Maoist, deep within our organization in order to sabotage us on a long-term basis from the inside. The Chinese reactionaries have taken thorough advantage of the natural closeness and the long standing neighborly relations between Vietnam and China; at the same time, they have used the army of persons of Chinese ancestry to gather information, create disturbances, carry out sabotage, foment rebellions and conduct subversive activities. They have attached special importance to intensifying their acts of sabotage in the border areas, at places where there are many Vietnamese of Chinese ancestry, in political, economic and cultural centers and so forth. As a result, in order to insure that the armed forces victoriously carry out every task in the new stage of the revolution, protecting the armed forces becomes work of extreme importance.

In the new stage, the objectives of security work must be to constantly heighten the revolutionary vigilance and the political responsibility of all cadres, soldiers, manual workers and personnel in the national defense system; firmly protect the unanimity regarding the lines, positions and policies of the party, firmly protect the organization of the party and the organization of the armed forces, especially the leadership and command agencies on the various levels; protect the ideological purity and the revolutionary qualities of each person within the army; absolutely maintain military secrets and insure the absolute safety of personnel and material-technical bases.

Security work must not solely be the work of the agencies in charge of it, but must be an aspect of the party work and political activities of the people's armed forces as well. Performing security work within the armed forces is the responsibility of the entire army, of each cadre and soldier. We must heighten the leadership role of the party organization, the organizational and management role of the command organization, the functions and tasks of the various sectors and the sense of collective ownership as well as the right of collective ownership of cadres and soldiers; the combined strength of each unit as well as the entire army must be tapped in security work. Security work must involve active prevention in order to not allow loopholes to develop and to firmly protect the armed forces politically, ideologically and organizationally.

The entire army must have a deep understanding of the extremely reactionary nature and the insidious scheme of the Beijing reactionaries and, as a result, see that Chinese spies are an immediate danger, especially at present, in order to constantly heighten the spirit of revolutionary vigilance of the entire army and bring about strong changes in the compliance with the policies and regulations on protecting against spies and maintaining secrets.

The Chinese reactionaries are the most evil traitors in the international communist and worker movement, are the extremely dangerous saboteurs of the effort by our army and people to build and protect the fatherland. However, they are masquerading as revolutionaries, as Marxists-Leninists in order to distort the line and policies of the party and state in a vain attempt to undermine the confidence that our soldiers and compatriots have in the party, in the socialist system and in order to

provoke divisions within the party and the army in the hope of causing negative, backward actions that result in the loss of the fighting strength of our armed forces. They use persons who have surrendered and committed betrayal and make every effort to win over elements who vacillate, are dissatisfied and have become degenerate as well as negative, backward elements.

The activities of the Chinese spy reactionaries are extremely dangerous. Clearly pointing out the extremely reactionary nature and exposing the fraudulent revolutionary face of the Chinese expansionists are steps that must be taken, steps that cannot be given light attention in order to intensify the protection of the armed forces in the new stage. Only by having a deep understanding of the enemy and clearly analyzing their insidious scheme is it possible to always alertly guard against and effectively thwart each of their acts of sabotage.

We must heighten the revolutionary vigilance and the sense of responsibility of every party member, cadre, soldier and manual worker and all personnel in the national defense system and constantly increase the fighting strength and the ability to win victory of the armed forces.

The enemies of our people, the imperialists in past years as well as the expansionists today, are extremely cruel and malicious. However, under the leadership of the party and displaying high revolutionary vigilance, our army and people have always been very steadfast and alert politically and smashed every insidious scheme of their psychological war and spy war, thereby helping to maintain and increase the fighting strength and the ability to win victory of our army and our armed forces.

However, it must also be realized that, in the realities of the revolutionary struggle in the world as well as in our country, losses have occurred at one place or another due to the lack or complete loss of vigilance. For this reason, the lesson in displaying high revolutionary vigilance is always of realistic value and cannot be given light attention.

Revolutionary vigilance is part of the political qualities of each cadre and soldier, which they develop through education and forging. The revolutionary vigilance within our people's armed forces must be comprehensive and thorough, encompassing realization, thinking and organization. Every individual has the responsibility to protect the party, protect the organization; every organization has the responsibility to protect cadres and soldiers. This is an important manifestation of the political quality of every person as well as every unit. It is also the basis for developing the spirit of voluntarily complying with the policies and regulations on maintaining secrets and guarding against spies. Only by being highly vigilant is it possible to distinguish right from wrong, truth from falsehood and phenomenon from essence in order to take appropriate steps to prevent and smash the arguments and the acts of sabotage of the enemy. The enemy uses the difficulties we are encountering in everyday life and the shortages we are experiencing to distort our policies. We must be even more vigilant and promptly expose every argument of the enemy; we must teach and manage cadres and soldiers so that they adhere to principles in their daily lives and maintain their pure revolutionary qualities, determined not to allow anyone to have a vague understanding of the enemy and fall to the

temptations of the enemy. The requirements of the army-wide movement to act in accordance with orders must be used to teach troops and bring about a change in the sense of organization and discipline of the entire army in complying with the lines and viewpoints of the party, with directives and orders, with regulations, etc. Party committee echelons, unit commanders and cadres must truly set the example in maintaining strict party discipline and army discipline. We must display a high spirit of self-criticism and criticism and thoroughly overcome every negative phenomenon, every decline in the will to fight and every manifestation of vagueness, a lack of vigilance or loose discipline that would create weaknesses and allow the enemy to sabotage us.

Leadership efforts must focus on thoroughly maintaining military secrets and absolutely not allowing secret documents to be revealed or allowing the enemy to learn our secrets.

The gathering of intelligence and the collecting of documents in order to learn military secrets are an objective of the enemy, the purpose of which is to support their acts of sabotage, the fomenting of rebellions and the preparation for and conduct of a war of aggression.

Maintaining secrets is a principle that has been concretized in the laws of the state and in the orders and regulations of the army. We must insure that every cadre, party member and soldier is truly concerned with protecting the party, protecting the line, policies, organization and prestige of the party and maintaining the secrets of the party, state and army regarding everything from matters of major importance to matters of minor importance, from the organization of forces to their weapons and technical equipment, from warehouses to battle positions and troop sites, from the contents of training programs to combat plans and so forth.

Importance must truly be attached to thoroughly educating and tightly managing personnel with regard to the maintenance of military secrets and national secrets. Cadres and soldiers, especially the command cadres on the various levels and in the various sectors, must be alert and clearheaded in the face of every attempt by the enemy to obtain information from us. In the face of specific phenomena and incidents, we must employ scientific and precise methods of examination and analysis and must obtain the opinions of the masses within the unit in order to examine and evaluate phenomena and incidents without being subjective or one-sided.

To maintain secrets, we must, through management and guidance, bring about strict compliance with the regulations on classified information; the specific regulations on the distribution, recovery, storage and transfer of documents and the taking of documents from agencies or into areas in which fighting is taking place; the regulations on the dissemination of information; the regulations on the relationships among the various sectors within the army and outside the army, on the relationships with persons on the outside; each regulation in orders, codes, policies and so forth. We must maintain secrets in what we say and what we write and in the internal dissemination of information as well as the dissemination of information in the public press.

We must achieve strict compliance with the regulations that provide for the absolute safety of the personnel and the material-technical bases of the armed forces in all circumstances.

In conjunction with stealing military secrets and gathering information on the situation, the enemy always looks for every way to commit sabotage in a vain attempt to harm our personnel and damage our material and technical bases. Their scheme is designed to affect the fighting strength of our troops and pose obstacles to the effort by our army and people to build the country. In the two wars to protect the fatherland on the southwestern border and the northern border, we saw the extremely cruel nature of the Beijing reactionaries even more clearly. In addition to destroying economic and cultural bases and plundering our property, they resorted to many very barbarous acts and massacred our people. When they suffered painful defeats and were forced to flee, they covered their path with mines and explosives and even dumped poisons into water sources in order to kill our compatriots and soldiers. Therefore, insuring the absolute safety of the personnel and the material-technical bases of the armed forces is an important task on all levels. This work must be thoroughly carried out while maintaining secrets at the same time. To carry out this task, it is first of all necessary to fully comply with existing policies and regulations and to research and concretize policies and regulations so that they are consistent with the present situation. We must deeply examine the various fields, services, branches, agencies, enterprises, warehouses, bases, air fields, military ports and so forth and establish clear policies and regulations that provide for the absolute safety of personnel and material-technical bases. Providing leadership that insures full compliance with the policies that provide for the absolute safety of the personnel and material-technical bases of the armed forces in all circumstances, especially the safety of leadership and command agencies, is the task of the party committees of the various levels and sectors. Together with providing leadership that results in compliance with the safety policies and increasing both the ability and the responsibility of command cadres, we must launch a movement to build basic units that are strong in every respect, develop many basic units that are strong in every respect and develop many units that earn the title "safe unit." Suitable unit security regulations must be adopted on the basis of its specific task and nature. The enemy excludes nothing in their attempt to sabotage us. As a result, we must give attention to preventing bold, public acts of sabotage and must, on the other hand, attach full importance to observation and detection in order to promptly and effectively stop their surreptitious, sophisticated acts of sabotage.

We must constantly concern ourselves with organizational security and not allow persons who are not politically qualified to enter the armed forces, especially the corps of party members and cadres and vital components, in order to insure that the army's organization is always pure and strong. To accomplish this, we must correctly implement the regulations on the standards, principles and procedures for selecting persons for the armed forces, in general, and each sector, service and branch, in particular. We must overcome the phenomena of doing as one sees fit, of not being strict and thorough in the recruitment of troops, thereby creating loopholes for elements that are politically decadent, hoodlums and ruffians to infiltrate the armed forces. However, we must also avoid being so narrowminded that we act in a manner contrary to the policy of the party and state.

On the other hand, attention must be given to closely managing the utilization of personnel, especially persons in vital components, the assignment of new cadres to the corps of cadres and the acceptance of party members. Organizational security and the security of the armed forces are the responsibility of the party committees and commanders on the various levels. Cadres who perform receiving work, local military agencies and draft agencies must concern themselves with this work. We must rely upon the masses and seek the opinions of the masses with regard to disclosing and supplying necessary information they have concerning security work. In the South, it is even more necessary that we give special attention to recruiting efforts and must avoid operating in an impetuous manner, avoid indulging personal feelings, avoid not fully complying with principles, procedures and political standards, etc. The use of remaining technical personnel of the puppet government must be very carefully and cautiously considered and must be carried out under reasonable guidelines.

Chinese spies collaborate with U.S. spies and the other types of spies. Their activities are very sophisticated and clever. They constantly change the forms and methods of their activities to suit specific circumstances. Therefore, the armed forces and the various leadership and command levels must intensify their research of the enemy and see all of their schemes and methods of operation in order to adopt an effective plan for preventing them and promptly uncovering cases in which the enemy is conspiring with or placing persons into our organization so that they can be urgently resolved before any harm is caused. The party committee echelons, the various command echelons and, in particular, the professional agencies must take the initiative in researching the enemy and must consider this an important job, one that must be appropriately improved. We must regularly teach troops and heighten their sense of vigilance and must adopt a plan to prevent and effectively thwart every activity of the enemy. Our army is a tightly organized army that is led and educated by the party, consequently, the enemy does not find it easy to place persons in our organization, conspire with persons or infiltrate our organization in order to commit acts of sabotage. However, it must be realized that if we are weak or if we are lax or lose our vigilance for one moment, the enemy is ready to look for every way to take advantage of these weaknesses in order to commit sabotage. Therefore, we must find and promptly educate persons within the army who are dissatisfied, who have degenerated and become deviant because they are persons with whom the enemy seeks to conspire. We must closely coordinate with the public security agencies in researching and eliminating spy and reactionary organizations. Particular attention must be given to purifying areas, especially military zones and vital areas. To accomplish this, importance must be attached to building the political base within each area as well as throughout the country. We must thoroughly study the divisive tricks and propaganda arguments, the psychological warfare activities and the activities of the enemy to conspire with and win over persons within our forces in order to adopt policies consistent with the characteristics of units and each specific period of time.

The command cadres and security agency cadres on the various levels must attach importance to researching the enemy. Only by deeply researching the enemy is it possible to learn the schemes and tricks they employ to sabotage us and, on this basis, help the party committee and the commander take preventive measures and

promptly retaliate against the enemy army. They must display a high spirit of responsibility and an urgent, timely and precise style and avoid being superficial and cursory. They must maintain close, regular relations with the various sectors and levels in the effort to understand, collect information on and detect activities of the enemy and, on this basis, integrate and analyse information and make observations so that the research of the enemy is of high quality and yields high returns.

Protecting the armed forces is one aspect of party work and political work, of command activities, the primary element in which is protecting the political line and the military line and viewpoints of the party, protecting the party organization and the organization of the armed forces. Therefore, it is work involving the mobilization of the masses and is the responsibility of the entire party, of the entire army, of all cadres and soldiers, not simply the work of security cadres and security agencies. Of decisive significance in the success of armed forces security work is complying with the principle the party committee leads, the commander organizes implementation and the various sectors and levels, depending upon their duties, perform security work within their specialized field. Security work must tap the spirit of socialist collective ownership of all cadres and soldiers in our armed forces in order to heighten the fighting strength and the ability to win victory of our army, thereby contributing along with all the people to winning victory over the enemy in every situation and firmly protecting the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

STEPS TO PREVENT REBELLIONS OUTLINED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 11, Nov 80 pp 8-17

[Article by Ha Thanh: "Rebellions and Preventing and Combating Rebellions"]

[] In order to thoroughly and quickly smash schemes of rebellion--a counter-revolutionary activity of hostile elements--we must first examine the laws governing rebellions, their form and nature, their special characteristics and their causes.

"After being defeated by the revolution, counter-revolutionary powers do not disappear, to the contrary, they will most certainly begin a new and even more fierce struggle." (1) In fact, they employ many different plans, even the most cruel and malicious, in a vain attempt to win back the "paradise" they lost. Among these plans, rebellion is considered by them to be a basic, strategic plan. The realities in our country, as well as many other countries, have proven this. Since the successful August Revolution, counter-revolutionary, hostile powers at home and abroad have continuously carried out many schemes and activities designed to foment rebellions. These have included the rebellions by the "Vietnamese revolutionaries" and the "Vietnamese nationalists" which were controlled by Chiang Kai-shek in Vinh Yen, Phuoc Yen and so forth in 1945 and 1946; the rebellions instigated by the French colonialists in Son Ha-Quang Ngai (1950-1953) and Lao Cai and Lai Chau, (1952-1956). Then, the U.S. imperialists, in their scheme to commit aggression against our country, established reactionary bases in a number of localities in a vain attempt to foment rebellions against the socialist revolution in the North. When forced to withdraw from South Vietnam, they formulated an entire "post-war plan," which included a long-range and very crafty scheme to foment rebellions. Deserving of attention was their active use of FULRO and counter-revolutionary elements masquerading as religious followers to foment rebellions in the Central Highlands and Hau Giang Province.

In order to carry out their scheme to weaken and annex our country, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists have long employed extremely malicious and cruel, large-scale and long-range plans involving many different activities with a view toward fomenting rebellions, especially in the provinces along the northern border. Excluding scattered incidents, as of 17 February 1979, rebellions masterminded by

then had occurred on the scope of one village and a number of villages, such as in Huong Khong in Hoang Lien Son Province, Dong Van in Ha Tayn Province, Hoanh Bo and Quang Ha in Quang Ninh Province and so forth.

Clearly, as long as there are reactionary and hostile elements (at home and abroad), they will continue to scheme to foment rebellions. According to them, rebellions cause the revolution and the people to encounter difficulties and suffer losses; can help them "start trouble" which will not only provide them with "the conditions" needed to operate, but also help them conceal their extremely decadent aggressive and reactionary nature; and, in keeping with their view of "profit above everything else," rebellions are "cheaper" than waging a civil war or a war of aggression. Every rebellion involves collaboration between imperialists and reactionaries on the outside with reactionaries within the exploiting classes and in the ranks of the former lackeys of former rulers in our country. Rebellions frequently bear such political labels as "independence," "liberation," "self-rule," "revolution" and so forth in order to attract elements that are dissatisfied with the system and deceive backward persons. Counter-revolutionary rebellions are most apt to break out at a time when we are encountering political, economic, military and other difficulties.

The objectives, forces, scope, form and so forth of rebellions differ depending upon the specific conditions at each place and time. Sometimes, reactionaries incite a very small number of misdirected persons to wage primarily a political struggle at first against the revolutionary government and press for certain demands in order to disrupt political security and social order, thereby reducing the prestige of the revolution, and in order to spy on us and prepare their forces. At other times, they persuade a number of persons within one or a few villages to arm themselves and arise in resistance to destroy the revolution, destroy the organizations of the party, government and revolutionary mass organizations, destroy the economy and the peaceful life of the people and then establish a puppet government and reactionary armed forces within the locality. Rebellions can start in one area and spread to many other places with the ultimate objective of overthrowing the revolutionary regime and establishing a reactionary regime; rebellions can also gradually turn into a civil war between the revolutionary people of the entire country and domestic reactionaries together with a number of persons who have been deceived and pressured and are supported and commanded by foreign reactionaries. Reactionaries can incite and cause a number of misdirected persons in an area (along the border, for example) to set up a "puppet government" and appeal for "help from the outside," thereby creating a "legitimate" reason for them to have troops come from the outside to commit aggression and to coordinate with the war of aggression. Rebellions can also occur at the same time as a war of aggression within small or large areas, within an individual battle or an entire campaign in order to create favorable conditions for the war of aggression. However, regardless of their form or extent, all rebellions are very dangerous. They destroy political security and social order; destroy the material-technical bases of the country, of the socialist system; destroy the revolutionary organizations, the revolutionary government and the life of the people; destroy us from within and limit, erode and weaken the system in many respects.

As seen in their objectives, forces and mode of activity, rebellions differ from a number of other forms and phenomena of opposition. Be they small or large, brief or lengthy, all rebellions have the objective of opposing and overthrowing the revolutionary government and establishing a reactionary government. Their forces always include a number of misdirected persons who have been bought or pressured by reactionaries at home and abroad. They involve both political and armed activities, sometimes beginning with primarily political or primarily armed activities and sometimes coordinating the two. When differentiating rebellions from other forms of opposition, it is necessary to do so on the basis of these three characteristics because rebellions are sometimes similar to these other forms in one or two of these characteristics. They differ from a war of aggression and civil war and from the activities of bandits, hoodlums and ruffians. However, they are related to the various forms described above. A rebellion can be the "catalyst" that opens the way to a civil war or a specific form of a civil war. A rebellion can involve activities that coordinate with a war of aggression. Sometimes, they are similar in form and extent to the activities of bandits, hoodlums and ruffians, even similar to the activities of backward, dissatisfied persons, thereby making it difficult for us to distinguish among these activities and handle them properly. There are also times when the enemy uses such similar activities to deceive us or takes advantage of these activities to serve its objectives, thereby creating favorable conditions for a rebellion to break out and spread. Therefore, differentiating among these differences and similarities as well as the relationships of rebellions to the forms and phenomena mentioned above is very necessary in order to take effective and suitable steps to deal with them.

Facts have shown that, in order to foment a rebellion, the enemy makes rather detailed preparations in order to create forces, create a position, create an excuse and create or take advantage of an opportunity for a rebellion. Foreign reactionaries, especially the Chinese expansionists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists, have employed and will continue to employ very malicious and insidious measures and methods. Most significantly, they make every effort to build and develop counter-revolutionary bases within our country; conspire with reactionaries that live in the various localities; make use of hoodlums and ruffians; use decadent elements among the Vietnamese of Chinese ancestry as an "underground army"; bribe, entice and pressure a number of our youths, people and cadres into following them; establish many counter-revolutionary organizations, sometimes even an entire "government apparatus" with armed units and so forth to serve as the "key" force in fomenting a rebellion when the necessary conditions exist.

They use military pressure, constantly create tensions, engage in acts of provocation and threaten war in a vain attempt to force us to constantly concentrate on the defense of the nation, on dealing with war so that our hands are not free to build the country; if we are weak and display shortcomings, they will commit aggression against us and annex us in coordination with fomenting a rebellion.

They give particular attention to destroying us economically by establishing trade embargos and pressuring other countries into not granting us aid or trading with us; by hijacking, detaining and destroying important goods, putting luxury goods on

our market, disrupting prices and disrupting the market, by creating difficulties for us in production and sabotaging our production capacity in a vain attempt to cause our economy to decline and our people to live in poverty.

They wage a very malicious form of psychological warfare, making detouring statements about our party and state, attempting to sow division between the ethnic minorities and our party and state and creating an attitude of skepticism and dissatisfaction among our people.

They also use Vietnamese traitors, such as Hoang Van Hoan, to pull the trick of sending a "letter appealing to the people" to oppose the party and state and use a number of misdirected persons as a "puppet government" issuing a "request that China come provide help," thereby creating a "legitimate reason" for them to commit aggression against our country.

Rebellions occur as a result of many factors, of many direct and indirect causes, both objective and subjective, that have to do with both the enemy and ourselves.

There are several main points that can be presented with regard to the causes of rebellions.

- * At places where the enemy has old or newly established bases and forces, they deceive, pressure and persuade a number of persons in the locality (sometimes even our cadres) to join with them and foment a rebellion.
- * Where there is "fertile ground" for them to use, they sow the seeds of rebellion. This "fertile ground" take the form of decadent vestiges of the old system, such as political and cultural backwardness; antagonisms among the various nationalities and localities; the presence of hoodlums and gangsters; the presence of difficulties in everyday life, economic difficulties and so forth. They give their attention to leading persons who are dissatisfied with our system astray and inciting them.
- * A rebellion can occur at places where our political base is still weak, the level of awareness of the people is low, the organization of the party, the government, the mass organizations, the public security forces and the mass armed forces are weak and so forth.
- * A rebellion can occur at places where we lack vigilance, are complacent and do not keep abreast of the enemy situation, do not suppress counter-revolutionaries and do not properly transform elements among persons who once took the side of the enemy in combating the revolution as well as hoodlums and gangsters. When we display shortcomings in complying with the policies of the party and government, such as the nationalities policy, the policy on religions, the economic policy and so forth, do not have the sympathy of the people and encounter difficulties, reactionaries use these as reasons to speak badly about us, to win over and incite the masses into opposing the revolution.

Clearly, fomenting rebellions is a basic, long-range and very dangerous scheme of the enemy, one that is in the nature of a law, especially with regard to the Chinese expansionists and the U.S. imperialists. For this reason, preventing and

combating rebellions are a basic, long-range task in the effort by the entire party, all our people and our entire army to protect the fatherland. At present, this task is even more important and urgent. All of the rebellions instigated by the enemy in the past have met with defeat. This was particularly true in the recent war of aggression on the northern border of our country, in which the reactionaries in Trung Nam Hai failed to foment one rebellion, even though they had spent very much time and money and pinned very many hopes on doing so. This indicates the strength of our system, of the people of the nationalities of our country, of the public security forces and our armed forces under the leadership of the party. It also shows that we have the ability and demands that we try even harder in many areas to firmly insure that we thoroughly and quickly eradicate and smash every scheme to foment rebellion.

In order to smash every scheme and act to foment rebellion, it is best to exterminate them in their infancy, at their origin and not allow them to occur, not even begin to occur; and, if such schemes and actions do occur, we must smash them very rapidly and thoroughly, holding the damage caused by them to the lowest possible level. This is an objective requirement of the revolution, of our people. However, this is a long, widespread, arduous and complex process of building and struggling, one in which the secret to success is organizing all the people in implementing every aspect of the line and policies of the party very well. Here, we shall only present a few aspects of building a comprehensive, strong and solid base; thoroughly preparing forces; implementing the nationalities policy very well; assessing the enemy situation very fully; and thoroughly understanding the thinking guiding the effort to prevent and combat rebellions.

1. Regardless of which activities the enemy conducts, they must carry them out within our units and basic organizations, that is, the villages, wards, factories, workites, state farms, agencies, schools and so forth. At these installations at which we are weak, the enemy will easily conduct activities and vice versa. Therefore, building a base that is strong and solid in every respect is not only the foundation of the new system, but also the foundation of the effort to prevent and combat rebellions. This demands that we focus appropriate efforts upon and skillfully organize the building of the base, especially in important, vital and key areas; give attention to everything but focus our efforts on keeping abreast of the most important matters during each period of time; very closely link the building of the base with the effort to prevent and combat rebellions. The basic, most decisive factor of long-range importance as well as the most important and urgent matter at this time is to build the party organization and the corps of cadres on the basic level so that they are of high quality and adequate size, large enough to lead the people in successfully building and firmly protecting the locality and the new system. The party organization and the corps of cadres must be truly progressive and vanguard, in terms of both their qualities and abilities, must be close to the people and must have the total confidence of and total unity with the people. On this basis, they must concentrate on establishing, guaranteeing and upholding the right of collective ownership of the people on the basic level and performing the various economic, cultural, political, military and other jobs well with a view toward accelerating production, developing the economy and stabilizing and raising the standard of living of the people. Facts have shown that once installations are strong in every respect, the system of collective ownership,

the new economy, the new culture and the new socialist man are formed, developed and strengthened. The sense of ownership of the people and their ability to exercise ownership constantly develop, the economy is rather prosperous, the political base is strong, the culture is progressive and the national defense and security systems are strong. This creates strong, superior vitality and an unprecedented strength that is not only fully capable of rapidly and thoroughly thwarting every scheme and act of the enemy to foment rebellion, but also capable of causing the disappearance of every factor, every piece of "fertile ground," every possibility for the enemy to foment rebellions, such as the lack of economic and cultural development, ethnic antagonisms, negative phenomena and so forth.

2. Reactionaries, especially the Chinese expansionists, attach very much importance to fomenting rebellions in the ethnic minority areas, especially in the areas along our country's northern border. Because, the level of economic and cultural development of the people there is still very low. Social ills and superstitions are still widespread. Some of the ethnic antagonisms left behind by the old system have not been thoroughly resolved. These are remote areas that border China and are inhabited by many Vietnamese of Chinese ancestry. Our people have long had relations with the people of China; they are neighbors and friends, work together, trade with one another and so forth. The enemy takes advantage of this situation in order to engage in activities designed to oppose the revolution, implement their "divide and rule" policy, set the persons of one nationality against the persons of another and incite the people to oppose the party and state. When conditions exist, they have misdirected persons "request that China provide assistance," thereby providing an excuse and the circumstances needed for them to commit aggression against our country.

Therefore, complying with the nationalities policy of the party very well is an extremely important, objective demand in preventing and combating rebellions and in maintaining the security of the fatherland. Our party and state are very concerned with the nationalities issue. "Correctly resolving the nationalities question is one of the tasks of strategic importance of the Vietnamese revolution" (the resolution of the 4th Congress of the Party). The solidarity of the 60 fraternal nationalities within the great Vietnamese family has been and will forever be a factor of victory, a beautiful tradition in the cause of building and protecting our country. This was further proven by the recent victory over the Chinese aggressors. The cadres and armed forces operating in the ethnic minority areas constantly displayed a high spirit of genuine unity and truly had confidence in, respected, loved and wholeheartedly helped the compatriots there, especially in times of difficulty; they concentrated their efforts on helping to train the corps of ethnic minority cadres to serve as the nucleus of the effort to uphold the right of collective ownership of the people and build a truly strong revolutionary government, mass organizations, armed forces and security forces. Together with their compatriots, they have built and strengthened the new production relations, accelerated production, carried out cultural development and improved the material and spiritual lives of the people. They have conducted intense propaganda activities among compatriots concerning the socialist system, the nationalities policy of the party and the tradition of solidarity of the nationalities of the entire country and exposed the schemes of big nation

expansionism, of divide and rule and of assimilating other nationalities together with the heinous crimes of the Beijing reactionaries. They have accelerated the "movement to maintain the security of the fatherland." They have established well organized forces to prevent and combat enemy sabotage and attempts to foment rebellion. They have resolutely and promptly exposed, guarded against and eliminated counter-revolutionaries, spies and saboteurs hiding among the people. They have harshly punished ringleaders who have committed many crimes, are obstinate and are hated by the people. They have transformed decadent elements well. They have overcome negative, backward phenomena. It is necessary to show the people of the various ethnic minorities that the nationalities policy of our party and government is correct, conforms with both reason and sentiment and is straightforward; at the same time, determined steps must be taken to prevent and overcome every violation, regardless of how small, of the nationalities policy that might cause compatriots to misunderstand it and give reactionaries an excuse to distort this policy, speak badly about us, sow the seeds of division and so forth. By doing this, the ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority in our country will become increasingly united in an invincible bloc and advance together toward socialism, defeating the decadent schemes of the enemy.

3. Forces are the decisive element in preventing and successfully combating rebellions. For this reason, it is absolutely necessary that we establish forces to prevent and combat rebellions that are sufficiently strong and always in a state of readiness. These are not new, special forces, but are the forces of all the people protecting the fatherland and maintaining the security of the country and the system, which includes preventing and combat rebellions. However, the effort to prevent and combat rebellions does involve special characteristics and requirements, consequently, when undertaking this task, these forces must be organized, commanded, armed and trained and must take action under a suitable plan. These forces become a very tight, strong force that prevents every enemy from conducting activities among our people, including psychological warfare activities; these forces have the ability to uncover and smash scattered cases of opposition, which are the origins of rebellions; and these forces have the strength needed to rapidly and thoroughly extinguish every rebellion, regardless of its scale and form.

These forces consist of the people's public security force, the security force, the police force, the armed forces, the various agencies and mass organizations and the people, including the elderly and children, with the public security force and the local armed forces serving as their nucleus. Each of the above mentioned elements of these forces are assigned specific, suitable tasks and requirements, provided with the necessary arms and trained in preventing and combating rebellions, especially the specialized cadres and components of these forces. These forces have a detailed plan for preventing and combating rebellions, a plan which takes many different situations into consideration, even the worst, a plan which is thoroughly researched and practiced. These forces have a unified leadership and command and operate under a common plan, thereby insuring that they are used at the correct place and time and are closely coordinated. It is even more important to build these forces at key, vital places. At places where the forces that prevent and combat rebellions are truly stable and strong, are competent and have

developed to the point where they are aware of every psychological warfare argument, every strange phenomenon, every footprint of a stranger within the locality and so forth, determine their origin and resolve these matters in a thorough fashion, these forces have been and will continue to insure that the life of the locality is quiet and peaceful and that nothing develops that could lead to a rebellion. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to use the practical activities of the forces that prevent and combat rebellions to inspect, train and supplement these forces so that they develop more with each passing day and are constantly being strengthened and necessary to avoid being subjective and complacent or building these forces in a form for form's sake manner or a disorganized manner, only attaching importance to their size without being fully concerned with their quality.

4. Facts have shown that an important reason for all rebellions fomented by the enemy, be they large or small, of short duration or long, is our failure to learn what the enemy is doing or the fact that we learned what the enemy was doing too late. In view of the fact that we are in political power and have strong forces, once we closely observe the enemy and learn what they are doing at an early date, we virtually exclude the possibility that they will foment a rebellion and can rapidly extinguish any rebellion they might foment. Therefore, understanding the enemy is one of the key elements in preventing and combating rebellions.

In the effort to prevent and combat rebellions, understanding the enemy is a very high requirement. We must have a very precise, timely, comprehensive, specific, full and continuous understanding of the enemy, the sooner the better. We must understand their schemes, policies, plans, forces, modes and methods of operation and the specific time at which they are likely to take action so that we are not deceived by the enemy. We must make a thorough evaluation and fully determine whether each type activity is covert or overt, in society or internal, being conducted by lackeys or ringleaders, backed by the Beijing expansionists or the U.S. imperialists, especially with regard to major organizations, personalities, incidents and areas. In the immediate future, it is necessary to closely observe the psychological warfare arguments of the Chinese reactionaries and the U.S. imperialists; their conspiratorial activities and their effort to build a base; acts of economic sabotage and so forth in order to promptly expose their organizations and schemes to foment large-scale, long-term rebellions.

In order to gain such an understanding of the enemy, it is important that we skillfully organize and mobilize our forces on the basis of appropriate, effective measures. We must mobilize all the people, including the elderly and children, to always be highly vigilant, observe the enemy and implement the slogan "every citizen is a security soldier." At the same time, using the specialized forces of the public security system as the nucleus of our effort, we must closely coordinate with the forces of the various sectors, from the basic level upward, and establish a network, an interconnected, scientific system under a unified command that exists at all times and places, thereby thwarting every enemy and every enemy activity. Attention must be given to creatively researching and establishing good measures for learning about the enemy by both specialized agencies and the masses, including professional measures employed by public security agencies, in order to thoroughly

interrogate captured enemy personnel, collect information from covert and overt sources, at home and abroad and so forth. We must improve the way we research the enemy situation; must integrate and analyze the information received from various sources in a scientific and clear manner; must determine which matters have been clarified, determine which need additional study and accurately predict future stages of development; and must disseminate information on the enemy situation to the various levels in an accurate, rapid and secure manner. By doing this and employing the strong forces of all the people exercising ownership within the new system, throughout the country and within each locality, we are fully capable of thwarting every scheme and act of the enemy to foment rebellion in their infancy.

5. Preventing and combating rebellions are difficult and complex matters. They require widespread, detailed, practical organizational work and a full understanding of the guidelines and thinking of the party concerning these matters.

In order to foment a rebellion, the enemy usually gives attention to persuading some of our cadres and people to join them in opposing the revolution. Moreover, it is always better to prevent a disease than to contract a disease and search for a cure. For this reason, "maintaining strong internal security and actively preventing rebellions" have become the guideline of utmost importance. By successfully implementing this guideline, we will insure that we are always internally pure and that the enemy cannot infiltrate our ranks or win the support of anyone within our organization or among our people, that is, it will eliminate the basic conditions needed to start a rebellion and thoroughly thwart this sinister scheme of the enemy. The guideline of "maintaining" and "preventing" is not a passive, negative, defensive guideline, but a positive, offensive one. It involves a process of building, teaching, forging and waging an internal struggle (even among the people) so that everyone is progressive, everyone is truly a new person, a strong, socialist collective master who always maintains high vigilance and is never deceived, bribed, controlled or used by the enemy. It demands very strict, self-conscious compliance with internal security requirements, including those concerning the hiring of personnel by agencies, foreign relations and so forth. It is closely linked to the process of building the new system, building the new economy, building the new culture, molding the new man and transforming negative, backward persons and phenomena in society.

Our country is still encountering many difficulties and cannot eradicate every possible cause of a rebellion in a short period of time. The enemy, although they know they have been defeated, will still try to foment a rebellion to achieve a specific objective. Moreover, on the basis of the revolutionary viewpoint of taking action, taking the initiative and being farsighted, we must always look ahead, must always prevent the worst possible situation and avoid being taken by surprise and suffering losses. Therefore, it is necessary to take the initiative and make thorough preparations in every area so that we can rapidly, systematically and thoroughly smash every rebellion that might occur. This readiness must be truly concrete and well coordinated in all areas, be under a unified command and be thoroughly rehearsed; it cannot be readiness in word only, readiness on paper only or readiness at only one time or only in one area. Experience has shown that if we achieve this "thorough readiness," we will not only be able to immediately thwart

every rebellious activity and avoid "not taking action until it is too late," thereby limiting the losses incurred by the people to the lowest possible level, but can also force the enemy to draw back and not dare be reckless again.

In order to foment rebellion, the enemy also regularly engages in many economic, political, cultural and military activities, including psychological warfare and spy warfare. Our struggle against rebellions is not a unique, separate struggle, but is organically linked to the entire cause of building and protecting the country. As a result, it is absolutely necessary to closely coordinate the effort to prevent and combat rebellions with the other activities. We must prevent and combat rebellions while protecting and stimulating the development of the economy and culture. At the same time, building the economy and culture is an effective way to prevent and combat rebellions. This demands that we truly attach importance to and skillfully organize coordination. Even the specialized forces that are directly in charge of preventing and combating rebellions cannot concern themselves solely with this task, rather, they must participate to some degree, participate on the scope possible and as actively as possible in the work of building the economy, developing the culture, strengthening the mass organizations and so forth. In this way, they will gain a more comprehensive understanding of what is involved in preventing and combating rebellions while helping the people and the other sectors realize that this is work of very vital importance to them. On this basis, the people and the various sectors will actively participate in the effort to prevent and combat rebellions, not only in their attitude, but also in specific plans and activities and with specific forces. This will stimulate smooth development in all areas and create a large, combined strength that will insure victory in the effort to prevent and combat rebellions.

Rebellious activities differ in terms of their objectives, forces, measures, forms, place and time. Preventing and combating rebellions are the work of the entire party, all the people, the entire army, of the entire dictatorship of the proletariat system and involve very many types of forces and different measures. Therefore, to insure that we successfully prevent and combat rebellions, it is absolutely necessary that we make correct and smoothly coordinated use of the various forces and measures in a manner consistent with the specific situation and on the basis of the strength of the new system, of all the people exercising ownership. It is necessary to research the specific situation regarding the enemy and ourselves so that an accurate decision can be made concerning the use of forces and the methods to be employed. We cannot be subjective or simply do as we see fit. With regard to each rebellion, we must determine whether the enemy's objective was broad or limited, whether they used few or many forces, whether these forces were local or came from the outside, whether the enemy used political measures or armed measures or coordinated armed measures with political measures, whether the site of the rebellion was in the countryside or the cities, the mountainous jungles or the lowlands, an ethnic minority area or a densely populated, religious area, whether the situation is simply a tense situation or marks the start of a war and so forth. What specific actions should we take at that time? Can we use many forces or few, which forces should we primarily rely upon and how should we utilize these forces to promptly smash the forces used by the enemy to carry out the rebellion?

These are very important questions that must be thoroughly studied in order to reach accurate conclusions and, on this basis, adopt the best possible measures for firmly insuring that we rapidly, systematically and thoroughly defeat every rebellion and limit our losses to the lowest possible level. Clearly, this demands scientific analysis, accurate decisions and determined, swift and creative actions based on a thorough understanding of the enemy and having forces of sufficient strength standing in readiness. We must avoid being subjective, simplistic, impetuous or hesitant and rightist; we must also avoid being dogmatic, arbitrary, conservative and one-sided.

Actual experience has shown us that in order to successfully combat rebellions, it is necessary to closely coordinate the force and suppression function of the dictatorship of the proletariat with its function of organizing and building and necessary to closely coordinate with the forces of the army and our people as well as coordinate professional, administrative measures with mobilization and education. Whether a rebellion is small or large, short or long, very dangerous or only slightly dangerous depends upon whether the enemy has the support of large numbers of persons or only a few persons. As a result, we must mobilize the masses in conjunction with correctly, promptly and resolutely punishing ringleader reactionaries. The key to success is skillfully organizing, mobilizing, educating and persuading the masses. If we separate the masses from the schemes and influence of the enemy so that they are not deceived by the enemy, the enemy will be unable to foment a rebellion regardless of how crafty or clever they might be and, if they should foment a rebellion, they will surely be quickly defeated.

At present, the effort to prevent and combat rebellions, which is part of the work of protecting our fatherland in order to thwart the schemes of the Chinese expansionists collaborating with the U.S. imperialists and the other reactionaries to weaken, commit aggression against and annex our country, is even more important, urgent and complex. This situation demands that our people's armed forces always set the example, take the lead and coordinate with the other forces and sectors, especially the people's public security sector, under a unified plan and guidance, thereby making the most positive contributions possible to immediately extinguishing every rebellion; in particular, we must adopt a thorough plan for preventing and combating rebellions occurring in war, when the Beijing reactionaries use them as a measure of strategic significance in their wars of aggression.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin: "The Two Strategies of the Social Democratic Party in the Democratic Revolution," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 40.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

NEED FOR WELL ORGANIZED STOCKPILES STRESSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 11, Nov 80 pp 18-24

[Article by Senior Colonel Le Tien Thinh: "Stockpiling Troop Messing Materials"]

[Text] Stockpiling troop messing materials is an important element and a basic requirement in the establishment of rear service reserves. It is not only a constant demand of each unit in order to maintain the daily eating standard, but also a pressing requirement in the task of making the preparations needed to maintain combat readiness and supporting the everyday lives of troops when combat occurs.

Therefore, in conjunction with supporting everyday activities, it is necessary to meet the requirement of establishing stockpiles for combat, especially with regard to units that have the task of maintaining combat readiness on the border and on remote islands.

I. Taking the Initiative in Establishing Stockpiles

In order to establish stockpiles of the stipulated quantity and quality, it is necessary to always have sources of materials for initial stockpiles and subsequent supplementary sources. Rear service materials, in general, and troop messing materials, in particular, are created from many different sources: the rear service sources of the country; the aid from the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries; the materials produced by the armed forces themselves; and the materials taken from the enemy. Each source has its own importance, strongpoint and impact and is created by means of many different modes. We must make use of and develop all of these sources before we can create strong, stable sources of stockpiled materials.

The country's sources of rear service materials are the primary sources of stockpiled materials and are sources that can be continuously mobilized on a large-scale while supplying materials to decentralized places and providing a centralized supply of materials in accordance with the common plan for defending the country and the combat needs on the various lines.

The country's sources of rear service materials are deployed locally, from the lower level to the upper level, at households, cooperatives and villages, in combat clusters

and within each district and province as well as the economic units of the state. These sources are gradually developed each year in order to create a large quantity of stockpiled materials, enough to meet the needs of a local people's war and a people's war carried out by main force military corps. The country's sources of rear service materials are mobilized on a nationwide basis and efficiently deployed at centralized sites in adjacent districts and provinces in order to insure a continuous resupply effort for the purpose of promptly and rapidly meeting each need of troops and correctly carry out the stipulated strategy.

The country's sources of rear service materials are created within the movements of our people to work and produce, build the economy and build socialism, are managed by the state and are distributed solely by the state in accordance with a common plan. Therefore, in conjunction with actively participating in the effort to increase these sources, the rear service agencies on the various echelons, especially the strategic and campaign echelons, must take the initiative in formulating a plan and the receiving of materials and the very rapid and good utilization of these primary sources of stockpiled materials of the various echelons in the highest possible spirit of responsibility.

The aid from the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries, which is managed and distributed by the state, is an important source of materials supplementing our stockpiles and requires that the various echelons receive and utilize this aid in a way in which it has a practical effect in supporting the daily lives of troops in combat.

The materials taken from the enemy are also a source which we must take over and utilize in exact accordance with stipulated policy in order to increase the sources of stockpiles of the entire army.

The materials created within the armed forces are not as large or diverse a source as the sources mentioned above, but they are of no less importance. This source is the local source that can supply many types of goods most rapidly to the armed forces for their buildup and combat operations. If it is closely guided and organized in a very tight and highly effective manner, this source can reduce the difficulties encountered by troops in their everyday lives, increase stockpiles and make them more stable and dependable. The creation of sources of materials by and within the armed forces is necessary at this time primarily because the economic situation and the everyday life of the country still involve difficulties and the supply capabilities of the state are limited. These difficulties and limitations not only have an impact upon the units in the rear area, but also affect the units tasked with maintaining combat readiness on the border, the seacoast and the islands on the defense line. Moreover, these are also places at which many more difficulties are encountered in production as well as everyday life compared to the lowland areas, especially difficulties with grain and food; they are areas with treacherous mountainous jungles, areas in which communications are underdeveloped and where, although strong changes have been made in the preparations for warfare, certain limitations still exist. In normal times, the daily supply of food for troops is inadequate and unstable; in times of war, this situation is difficult to overcome if there are not local sources of materials to supplement daily consumption and establish long-term stockpiles.

Therefore, every echelon and unit must, whether it is in the rear or on the front, regardless of the activity in which it is engaged in the maintenance of combat readiness and regardless of whether it is in an advantageous or disadvantageous position, create its own sources of troop messing materials by means of intensifying the movement to work and produce, primarily produce grain and food products. Only in this way is it possible to establish dependable, local sources of troop messing materials in order to take the initiative in supplying some grain and food products, maintaining the daily eating standard of units and, at the same time, helping to maintain and supplement immediate and long-range sources of stockpiled materials. This is also a way to join all the people in successfully establishing a grain and food balance among the various areas and localities of the country and reducing the contributions that must be made by the people.

Accelerating production and creating sources of troop messing materials are the common responsibility of each person, of the various command echelons and of the rear service sectors. Production in the rear area is difficult but production on the border and the islands is even more difficult because it is controlled by geographical conditions and the circumstances surrounding the maintenance of combat readiness. The problem faced here is that of having to carry out production in accordance with a specific plan, under clear, detailed production guidelines, in a suitable form of organization and with a suitable labor force in relatively stable production areas that are tightly managed and commanded.

The effort to increase production is carried out on the basis of the combat readiness task, the combat task and the specific production task and norms of each echelon and unit; however, every echelon and unit must comply with the thinking guiding production within the armed forces.

As regards the production plan, it must first of all be based on the actual capabilities of the unit with regard to labor, arable land, implements, supplies, capital and so forth; at the same time, it must be closely linked to and unite as one with the combat plan and the overall plan of the unit. If a norm of the production plan is unsuitable and restricts the effort to improve the combat readiness capabilities and combat capabilities of the unit, it must be recalculated and adjusted so that it is truly suitable in order to insure that both the production task and the combat readiness task are carried out well.

As regards production guidelines, it is necessary to select those crops and species of livestock that are suited to the arable land, climate, weather conditions, ability to cultivate and tend these crops and livestock and the circumstances surrounding the buildup, training and combat readiness of the unit. The best practice is to concentrate on the cultivation of subsidiary food crops, grain crops and annual food crops that do not require complex techniques and the raising of fish, livestock and poultry that do not require much grain or food. Where possible, industrial crops can be raised to support export activities in order to trade for grain and food products.

As regards the organization of production, it is important to achieve relative stability in the organization of production and the production area. In conjunction with launching a widespread production movement among the masses in order to raise

products around barracks and at battle positions, it is necessary to adopt a plan for organizing centralized production installations on a medium and small scale in a manner closely linked to building the rear service bases of the unit. The labor forces for the two forms of organization of production mentioned above consist of two types: rotating labor working on the basis of obligations and specialized labor constituting a stipulated percentage of troop strength. The organization, deployment and management of these forces are carried out in accordance with a unified plan that is closely linked to the plan for deploying and mobilizing combat forces under the centralized, unified command of the unit commander.

Production is carried out under the conditions of maintaining a high level of combat readiness, urgently building and training units and many difficulties and shortages as regards material bases, technical bases and so forth; therefore, the various echelons must concentrate their efforts on providing very good economic management and production management, beginning with managing the plan and managing labor. This is an element that has a decisive impact upon the productivity, quality and economic returns of production and is one that must be further strengthened in order to quickly put production on a stable, sound footing.

By doing a good job of creating sources of materials within the units of the armed forces while developing and utilizing other sources, we will surely establish the stockpiles needed to meet the requirements that have been set forth.

II. Efficiently Organizing and Deploying Stockpiles

Stockpiling materials is an indispensable requirement in every situation and insures the prompt and full supply of the materials needed for units to engage in continuous activity. Therefore, after creating sources of materials, we must know how to efficiently organize and deploy both daily stockpiles and stockpiles for combat.

The organization and deployment of stockpiles of troop messing materials are the same as the organization and deployment of rear service materials, in general, in that it is necessary to closely adhere to the military task and the combat requirements of the armed forces, of both main force units and local units, and to have victory in combat as the highest objective. These are also the bases for establishing the guidelines and requirements regarding the organization and deployment of stockpiles of troop messing materials on the defense lines in exact accordance with the established military task and combat requirements. This is also work involving many difficulties and problems, work for which the various echelons and units must make comprehensive, continuous preparations of many different forms; these preparations must be made gradually, made each month and each year, in order to establish adequate stockpiles and, once these stockpiles have been established, plans must be adopted for efficiently deploying them.

Separate requirements exist with regard to the deployment of stockpiles of troop messing materials; however, this deployment absolutely must be consistent with the mode of providing rear service support by region on all strategic, campaign and tactical echelons in accordance with the common mode of warfare and must be consistent with the strategic deployment in both breadth and depth. The deployment

of stockpiles of troop messing materials on every echelon must be organized in advance on both the front and in the rear; there must be adequate warehouses, stockpiled materials, communication routes, means of transportation, bases and support forces in accordance with the plan within each region. In order for this deployment to be sound and efficient, it is also necessary to create a close link among the various stockpile systems on each combat line, throughout the army and throughout the country. This is the link between the stockpile systems of the main force units and the widespread, local stockpile systems among the people, between the stockpile systems of the central level and the stockpile systems of the localities, of the rear service agencies on the upper and lower levels. On this basis, efficient, dependable and interconnected stockpile regions and networks are established, thereby creating a stockpile system extending from the central level to the basic units.

The problem faced here is that regardless of the difficulties we encounter, we must endeavor to stockpile an adequate, complete and well coordinated quantity of high quality materials while always maintaining routine stockpiles and promptly increasing them. The stockpiles established on an echelon are based on the requirements of the combat task and the material consumption ceiling of that echelon. However, from the strategic echelon to the tactical echelon, it is necessary to meet the requirement of establishing comprehensive, well coordinated stockpiles in each area of support operations and to stockpile an adequate quantity of materials of the correct type in accordance with the requirements of the combat support plan. Of course, every echelon has a different scope and level of stockpiles. The strategic echelon stockpiles many more materials and a wider variety of materials intended to last for a longer period of time than the campaign echelon does. The campaign echelon primarily provides adequate stockpiles for the daily lives of troops and some for the combat activities of this echelon and the units under it. The tactical echelon and the basic units, although their stockpiles are smaller and encompass fewer types of materials than the strategic and campaign echelons, must still establish their stockpiles on the basis of the objectives of maintaining the daily eating standard and daily activities of the unit.

As is the case with the other stockpiles for combat, the stockpiles of troop messing materials in combat also must be governed by uniform regulations on the basic amount of each type material. These stockpiles must meet daily needs, provide for supplementary materials, be able to be stored and carried by troops and be suited to the means of transportation on each echelon. The materials included in the stockpiles, especially stockpiles for combat, absolutely must strictly comply with the regulations on the basic amount; reducing or increasing this amount or apportioning it among echelons are prohibited. Long-term stockpiles are closely related to day to day consumption, consequently, it is necessary to make calculations and balance combat reserves and daily consumption. Regardless of the difficulties encountered in everyday life, combat stockpiles cannot be used for daily consumption. These stockpiles can only be used in combat and, regardless of how urgent the need for them might be, an order from the authorized command echelon is necessary in order for them to be used and steps must be taken to promptly supplement them instead of allowing them to be depleted.

In order to efficiently organize and deploy stockpiles of troop messing materials, it is necessary to establish widespread, deep stockpiles of materials on all echelons,

in all units and on all lines in accordance with the division of echelons and at key places. The strategic rear service echelon is not only the place that receives material bases from the state and maintains a close relationship between the state and the army, but also plays a very important role in fully projecting the required stockpiles in the immediate future and over the long range for the entire army. As a result, the strategic rear service agency must take the initiative in guiding the lower echelons in correctly implementing the assigned stockpile plans. It is necessary to organize transportation from the rear to the frontlines and, at the same time, manage, maintain and deliver each material to the hands of troops in a prompt manner in exact accordance with regulations and standards. On the other hand, it is necessary, on the basis of the circumstances and requirements surrounding the daily lives of troops in the different areas, especially on the frontlines, to research and improve the means of daily life and the processing of grain and food products so that they are suitable for daily meals as well as suitable when warfare occurs.

The military regions, military corps, services and branches must have a clear and specific division of labor and division of echelons in order to establish efficient stockpile lines and have plans for supplying and supplementing lower echelon units, thereby insuring that the stockpile plan is not interrupted in any situation.

Units from the division, provincial and municipal echelons and below, although the size and diversity of their stockpiles are not as large or wide as the strategic and campaign echelons, must stockpile the majority of their materials for the lower echelon without concentrating too much on the battalion and company echelons.

This means that stockpiles must be widely organized and deployed in all units, regions and strategic fronts, both in the rear area and on the frontlines, and that full importance be attached to organizing and deploying local stockpiles within the combat formation and on lines near the enemy. However, we must also link these stockpiles together in accordance with the combat plan and the strategy that has been established so that the various places that have stockpiles can resupply one another when necessary, maintain their stockpiles and maintain the eating standard of troops even under the conditions of intense combat lasting for many days.

In the process of preparing and implementing the plan for stockpiling troop messing materials, full attention must be given to transportation. If the transportation plan is not thoroughly prepared and implemented, the stockpile plan will be disrupted and materials will not reach the hands of troops in exact accordance with standards. Moreover, even when the stockpile line has much grain and food, troops on the frontline can still experience hunger because these supplies cannot be transported. This is not to mention the case in which it is necessary to receive many supplies at one time and there are not adequate warehouses to store and maintain these supplies and the case in which it is necessary to maintain stockpiles in heavy combat that lasts for many days, combat in which troops are constantly on the move or must remain at their position for a long period of time. Properly

organized transportation also plays a role in combating shortages and losses along transportation routes and combat waste and pilfering in the various stages of transportation. With properly organized transportation that employs many different modes and suitable means of transportation, the stockpile plan can be implemented everywhere, be it the border, the remote islands or places in the wilderness.

III. The Establishment of Good Stockpiles Must Go Hand in Hand with Managing and Maintaining Them Well and Utilizing Them Correctly

The management, storage, protection and use of the materials included in the stockpile plan are very important, especially with regard to units performing tasks on the borders and the islands. Moreover, these are places where combat easily breaks out and, if these jobs are not performed well, it might be difficult to provide an ample supply of grain and food to troops so that they can correctly carry out their combat plan. Because, the characteristics and difficulties of these places differ from the characteristics and difficulties of areas in the midlands and lowlands. The economy as well as communications are underdeveloped, local supply capabilities are limited, the climate is damp and harsh and grain and food products easily become moist and rapidly spoil. For this reason, stockpiled materials must be managed the same way the materials consumed on a daily basis are. This management must be oriented toward keeping constantly abreast of the quantity and quality of existing stockpiled materials and the daily changes in each material. It is necessary to routinely take inventory and conduct inspections within basic units and at warehouses from the upper to the lower echelon in order to quickly detect losses and shortcomings in storage procedures, in order to protect and utilize these materials and in order to promptly supplement and balance them.

The maintenance and protection of stockpiled materials are not only requirements with regard to goods that have been stored in warehouses, although this is the key element, but also a requirement that must be met with regard to dried goods as well as fresh goods that are being transported or being handled at wharves or yards. Maintenance and protection must not only be thorough on the strategic and campaign echelons, but must also be carried out in exact accordance with policies and regulations on the tactical echelon and at basic units.

In order to maintain stockpiled materials well, it is necessary to have a good system of warehouses and means of storage, a responsible corps of personnel who know the techniques of storage and adequate means to properly store all existing products. Materials must be rotated and replaced in accordance with regulations and old materials must be periodically replaced with new ones in order to maintain the quality of materials and keep an adequate quantity stockpiled. In order to firmly protect stockpiles in both normal times and in times of combat, it is important to establish a very good deployment of stations along combat lines, stations which are strong, are developed in depth and have all the stipulated stockpile materials, in order to supply large units and the fronts on which many troops are concentrated and stations which are decentralized in a manner suited to the division of local management, protection and supply echelons and convenient for small units and mobile units. The deployment of warehouses along combat lines

and at specific sites within each area, each region and each combat area of operation is the correct course to select; however, this is no reason to place the station warehouses of the lower echelon behind the warehouses of the upper echelon or at places that are too far from the combat formation, thereby posing difficulties to the effort to resupply the various types of materials when necessary. To achieve this deployment, it is also necessary to adopt plans and establish forces to combat every act of sabotage by the enemy in war and adopt plans and measures for guarding against spies, protecting secrets and protecting the safety of station warehouses in time of war.

It is extremely important to have adequate stockpiles and extremely important for these stockpiles to be managed, maintained and protected well; however, if these stockpiles are not used correctly, it is impossible to implement the established stockpile plan. Therefore, it is necessary to very closely guide the use of stockpiles, insuring that it is both efficient and economical, and necessary to establish and correctly comply with regulations on the quantity of materials consumed on a regular basis and the quantity consumed in combat in order to adopt a plan for promptly supplementing stockpiles. A determined effort must be made to stop every phenomenon that involves the haphazard, wasteful use of stockpiles and violates the regulations on the use of stockpiles, especially with regard to stockpiles for combat.

The stockpiling of troop messing materials is a major part of the plan for the stockpiling of rear service materials and is directly related to the daily eating standard of troops in combat. This is an important matter involving many difficulties and problems; however, with close leadership by the various party committee echelons, very close, effective command and organization of implementation by the various command echelons and the rear service agencies on the various echelons, the concern of the state and the close collaboration and wholehearted support of the various sectors, the various circles and all people of the various localities, we will surely correctly implement the stockpile plan that has been established.

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CSO: 4209

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

COLUMN CRITICIZES ABSENCE OF EVEN COMMON CONSUMER GOODS

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 10 Jan 81 p 3

[Consumer's Notebook column: 'The Difficult Situation Cannot Be That Bad!']

[Text] As one visited a number of general merchandize stores in these first days of the new plan, one could not help being surprised to see their counters being completely empty. While it was cold and rainy, the tailoring counter did not have socks, heavy coats, quilted blankets, waterproof materials, etc. Some counters displayed as decoration many paper fans instead!

Many items of daily usage like matches, chopsticks, glasses, nails, chalk, pens, etc. were also absent. In the meantime, there were "silly" items available to customers who would not know what to buy them for!

The common difficult situation is something everybody has known. But can this situation be so bad that we do not have even some toothpicks and a pair of chopsticks? In what links was it wrong? Was it true that the function of commerce acting on production had been too weak? If the old order prices are no longer suitable for the present situation, why can't we act on our own initiative and in time and recommend new prices which will be more rational?

5598

CSO: 4209

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

HANOI ORGANIZES, SETS REGULATIONS FOR MARKET MANAGEMENT

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 10 Jan 81 p 3

[Article: "Organizing and Setting Regulations for Market Management"]

[Text] Implementing Resolution 26 of the Political Bureau and Decrees Nos 310-CP, 311-CP, 312-CP and 313-CP of 1 October 1980 of the Council of Ministers, Hanoi has adopted plans for organizing and stepping up market management. It set up a Municipal Market Management Committee, whose chairman is a deputy chairman of the People's Committee, assisted by a deputy chairman in charge, and members are representatives of these sectors and mass organizations: commerce, grain, food and beverage, pricing, public security, women's association, youth union and trade unions. The committee has to fulfill the task of assisting the Municipal People's Committee in leading, guiding, checking and supervising wards, districts, cities and sectors in order to make them properly carry out market management positions, policies and measures; studying and recommending adoption by the Municipal People's Committee of market management regulations; and suggesting the necessary measures to correct in time any shortcomings in their implementation.

Every ward and district and the City of Son Tay will set up their own market management committees, with similar makeup, to assist the people's committees of their own in providing leadership over the transformation and management of market in their localities in accordance with central and municipal policies.

Each locality is to set up a mobile market inspection unit to assist its own market management committee in inspecting and controlling the market within the locality. This unit at the district level should have 7-9 members. Some districts like Gia Lam and Tu Liem and the City of Son Tay need to have 13-15 members for their unit. The urban wards should need 20-30 members. A unit is divided into teams of 3-5 members consisting of cadres from such sectors as commerce, finance and public security, with the unit deputy chiefs serving as team leaders.

The task of mobile market inspection units is as follows:

- To inspect, to uncover speculators and smugglers, to seize goods, evidences of criminal acts to be handled in wards or districts.
- To inspect, to set fines in the cases of doing business without permits, against regulations and other cases; to collect taxes per business trips and merchandise taxes from people having not yet paid any taxes.
- To disperse crowds gathering and doing unlawful business on sidewalks and streets.

The authority of these units is as follows:

- To make reports on seizing goods and evidences of criminal acts.
- To make reports on setting fines ranging from 10 to 50 dong.
- To bring, if necessary, the people having committed criminal acts to the organs responsible for handling such cases.

Every subward and every key village (to be determined by the people's committees of wards, districts and cities) must set up a market management team of 3-5 people, consisting of 1 or 2 commercial cadres, 1 public security cadre and 1 tax cadre, with team leader being the village deputy chairman or the deputy chairman of the subward administrative delegates' committee. The task of these teams is as follows:

- To watch closely and get to know well the people who are engaged in business activities in the village or subward; to assist the village people's committee or subward administrative delegates' committee in considering and recommending that the ward or district people's committee issue, refuse to issue or revoke business permits in accordance with current positions and policies for different cases.
- To organize, arrange and manage the exchange locations in subwards, markets, hamlets and villages (if any).
- To collect merchandise taxes and taxes per business trips from people having not yet paid any taxes.
- To assist local authorities in organizing conferences for the masses to fight against and educate the people doing unlawful business; to keep files and recommend ward and district people's committees' action forcing those people who

smuggle and avoid work while refusing to correct themselves, but not to the extent of being prosecuted, to work.

- To coordinate activities with and assist the ward and district market management units in investigating, watching closely and arresting speculators and smugglers.

The authority of the teams is as follows:

- To check business permits of people doing business within their subward and village.
- To seize goods and evidences of criminal acts and to bring them to their ward or district for judgment; if necessary, to bring the suspects along.
- To make reports on setting fines ranging from 5 to 30 dong for violations of business regulations.

In key locations like railroad stations, bus terminals, major traffic axes and markets, a number of state stores must organize daily inspection.

In some specific places like Hanoi railroad station, Long Bien bus terminal and the markets of Dong Xuan, Bac Qua, Mo, etc., it is necessary to arrange different shifts to ensure continuous control from morning till night.

In areas of concentration of farm products and specialized production in accordance with state project and plan, during the entire period of purchase, it is necessary to set up control stations where they are needed in order to control and stop unlawful activities of the people who do business there.

In addition to inspection units that work openly, it is necessary to use other forces to investigate, closely watch, uncover and punish speculators, smugglers, people who make bogus coupons, buyers and sellers of gold and foreign currency and illegally imported goods, and people who in collusion and through connection with one another steal materials and goods from the state.

As to those people who score achievement in market management, in addition to a moral reward, material awards will also be granted them in accordance with Decree 312/CP of 1 October 1980 of the Council of Ministers as follows:

- People who uncover smuggling, speculating and hoarding rings are awarded 5-10 percent of the value of the confiscated goods (or fines and taxes).
- People who directly participate in tracking down the criminal offenders are awarded 10-15 percent of the value of the confiscated goods (or fines and taxes).

Those who abuse their positions of authority to assist and protect dishonest business people, speculators and smugglers, or to collude with the gangs that steal state properties to sell goods to dishonest business people and those who receive bribes of tax money and confiscated goods are severely punished according to the law.

At the same time, the Municipal People's Committee has adopted procedures for granting allowances to cadres directly doing market inspection and management work as follows:

Night shift allowance: Those who are required to work the night shift from 2200 hours to 0600 hours receive for every hour worked an allowance equal to 30 per cent of their principal wages and zone allowance and wages allowance (if any).

Within the hours of the night shift, those who work 4 hours or more can buy supplemental rations at supplying prices. A night-shift supplemental ration is set by this standard: 40 grams of meat or fat, 20 grams of sugar and .2 gram monosodium glutamate.

The ward, district and city market management committees are to decide about who are required to work night shifts.

Overtime allowance: If overtime (beyond the required working hours) is worked, every hour worked is given supplemental pay on the basis of the principal wages and zone allowance and wages allowance (if any). If the overtime is less than an hour, no supplemental pay is computed.

The ward, district and city market management committees are to decide about the cases of overtime required.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

HANOI SETS PRICES, LOCATIONS FOR SALES OF HOGS TO STATE

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 8 Jan 81 p 4

[You Should Know column: "Announcement of Hog Sales Locations in Urban Hanoi"]

[Text] To make it convenient for workers, civil servants and people in urban Hanoi to sell hogs, if they want to, to the state at agreed prices, the Food Products Corporation announces the following locations for hog sales:

- Ba Dinh Ward: the home of Mr Con, 2 Cao Ba Quat Street.
- Dong Da Ward: the home of Mr Chanh, 17A Collective of Civilian Construction Corporation, Van Chuong Alley (section of one-story houses).
- Hai Ba Trung Ward: the home of Mr Thinh, 295 old Mo Market Alley (Bach Mai Street).
- Hoan Kiem Ward: purchasing station, 214 Hang Bong Street (in working hours).
- Or call telephone No 56691 (in working hours).

These are current purchasing prices of hogs in urban Hanoi: hogs weighing 80 kilograms and more: 23 dong/kilogram; from 70 to less than 80 kilograms: 22 dong/kilogram; from 60 to less than 70 kilograms: 20 dong/kilogram; from 50 to less than 60 kilograms: 19 dong/kilogram; from 35 to less than 50 kilograms: 18 dong/kilogram.

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AGRICULTURE

HANOI REPORTS ARTICLE ON GRAIN PRODUCTION IN HAU GIANG

BK121645 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 11 Mar 81

[QUAN DOI NHUAN DAN article by (Quang Chau) Entitled: "Grain Procurement for the 10th-month Crop Season in Hau Giang"—date not given]

[Text] The rice is turning golden throughout Hau Giang. During the last 10th-month crop season, the province overfulfilled the plan for rice planting by almost 2,000 hectares and scored an increase of almost 30,000 hectares over the 1979-80 10th-month crop season.

Thanks to favorable weather and the application of intensive cultivation methods, a bumper crop was reaped on 331,715 hectares of alluvial land with either brackish or fresh water. Since early December 1980 busy harvesting activities have been underway in Area 1, formerly Soc Trang, which consists of seven districts and one city located mostly on brackish-water alluvial land. Never before had Area 1 of Hau Giang reaped as large an amount of paddy as in this 10th-month crop season, with average yields ranging from 2.2-2.5 tons per hectare. On the more than 30,000 hectares planted in rice in this area, all the districts scored high yields and most of the production collectives achieved a yield ranging from 3.5-4 tons per hectare on their respective ricefields. Some localities in Long Phu, My Xuyen and Ke Sach scored even higher yields that ranged from 4.5-5 tons per hectare. The party committee and the people's committee of Hau Giang Province, by providing concentrated guidance to Area 1 and helping it with fertilizer supply, irrigation work, ricefield transformation and so forth, has enabled this area to achieve a bumper crop and gradually advance to planting two or three crops a year.

Throughout the province this 10th-month crop season also marked a new change in intensive cultivation. On the basis of zoning and land planning, the province established suitable seed allocation patterns and cultivation systems for each area. Depending on soil conditions in each area, such new and highly productive rice strains with a high resistance to harmful insects as IR-42, "Bong Huong," HT-16, HT019, MLT-30 and so forth have gradually replaced the old, long-term low-yield varieties. In particular, in the 1980 10th-month crop season the province supplied the local peasants and production collectives with tens of thousands of tons of fertilizer in the form of advance loans. As a result, even families that were short of money had enough fertilizer for their ricefields. In previous years, the

province sold fertilizer for cash and many families with financial difficulties had no fertilizer while rich families stocked up on fertilizer for future resale at exorbitant prices.

Some districts beset with difficulties, such as Vinh Chau, have received all-round assistance from the province. Formerly, Vinh Chau was in a state of constant famine but it has now achieved self-sufficiency in grain and is contributing more and more grain to the state. In the 1980 10th-month rice season, Vinh Chau was also a district that produced a fairly good crop.

At present, Hau Giang is stepping up agricultural transformation and reorganizing production. It is continuing zoning, land planning and irrigation planning, and is constantly making investments in science and technology to advance agriculture. This is the way for the province to improve the people's life and to contribute more and more grain to the state as Comrade (Huynh Van Tri), deputy head of the provincial grain office, told us.

In 1980, of the whole province only Than An village, Thot Not District scored the provincial record for the amount of grain delivered to the state in a single day--500 tons. Thanh An village became a model in grain procurement for the entire province to study. In this 10th-month crop season, although the harvest has yet to be finished, scores of villages--including Long Phu, Lich Hoi Thuong and Trung Binh, Long Phu District, and Tan Hung and Thanh Tri, Thanh Tri District--collected from 600 to 800 tons of grain a day. In particular, Long Phu town procured 1,000 tons of paddy and Lieu Tu village delivered 1,100 tons to the state granaries in just 1 day. Truong Khanh, a village noted for its experience in intensive cultivation, had a successful crop in this season. After reaping only 500 hectares, it had collected 841 tons of rice for the state. Truong Thanh a hamlet scored an average procurement rate of 4 tons per hectare and Truong Thanh B hamlet, 2.8 tons per hectare. Long Phu town and Long Phu, Lien Tu, Lich Hoi Thuong and Trung Binh villages, Long Phu District, and Thanh Tri and Tan Hung village, Thanh Tri District, virtually fulfilled the grain procurement for the 10th-month crop season.

Hau Giang Province mobilized all available transportation means to move rice. Boats and trucks operated nonstop day and night but towering heaps of rice kept growing in the yards of district and village granaries.

Generally speaking, in this 10th-month crop season, Hau Giang procured grain 2 or 3 times as fast as it did in 1976, the year in which it procured the largest amount of grain in the last 5 years.

In 1981, as of 10 February, Hau Giang had fulfilled more than 62 percent of the 10th-month grain procurement target, with the grain collected as tax accounting for 30 percent of the amount procured. Long Phu, My Xuyen, My Tu, Thanh Tri and Vinh Chau districts and Soc Trang city fulfilled from 80-109 percent of the procurement target. In particular, Vinh Chau and Long Phu districts and Soc Trang city overfulfilled the plan target by 6-9 percent.

These results represent a great effort of the party organization and people of Hau Giang. Implementation of the resolution of the sixth party Central Committee

plenum, resolution No 26 of the political bureau on distribution and circulation and subsequent state policies has created new conditions for Hau Giang to develop agricultural production and distribution and circulation.

To insure good results for the grain procurement task in 1981, as early as September 1980 the province held several conferences in two areas to learn from its experiences in guiding grain procurement work in the past year and to discuss new policies and measures so as to provide more effective and more timely guidance in the following year.

In the conference held early in December 1980 to review grain procurement, Hau Giang commended and rewarded 10 districts and 55 villages—including 25 villages which had procured more than 5,000 tons each annually—for their outstanding achievements in grain procurement in 1980. At the same time it assigned grain and food procurement norms for 1981 to its districts.

More than 1 month before harvesting the early rice, the provincial party committee issued specific guidelines for each task related to grain procurement. These tasks included establishing tax records, collecting debts, fulfilling two-way contracts and buying grain at agreed prices.

The compiling of agricultural tax records, though still slow, was done more accurately than in the previous years, adding thousands of hectares of newly discovered acreage to the cultivated area of several districts. The comrades in charge of the grain, financial and banking sectors, under the guidance of a comrade member of the Standing Committee of the provincial party committee who was permanently assigned to a specific area, worked directly with the districts, following, controlling and supervising their work and helping resolve the problems facing various echelons.

Every 10 days a conference was held at the district level to review and evaluate grain procurement efforts, promptly commend those units which had done well, correct errors and shortcomings and adopt measures to overcome difficulties.

Hau Giang concentrated its resources on the grain procurement campaign. Its planning, grain, financial, trade, banking and communications and transportation sectors worked in close and harmonious cooperation. The province concentrated all the ships and boats and vehicles it could mobilize for transporting grain to granaries. The provincial and district armed forces helped the localities with the harvesting, handling and transporting of grain. More than 2,000 grain-handling workers from the state labor force satisfactorily fulfilled their active role.

This year, the grain sector of Hau Giang further improved its capability to deliver grain to granaries. The provincial grain service closely guided the organization of grain delivery in the districts and villages, thus increasing the capacity of a village to receive and store grain from 200 to 3,000 tons and of a district from 3,000 to 9,000 tons. The procurement network composed of 200 teams actively operated in all villages. More than 100 state-owned and private mills were mobilized.

A noteworthy fact in this 10th-month crop season was that any locality which had many production collectives could rapidly, efficiently and satisfactorily harvest and procure grain. Long Ha town, a locality chosen by Long Phu District for organizing production collectives on an experimental basis, excelled in grain procurement work in this 10th-month crop season. In less than 40 days since the beginning of the year, three villages and more than 100 production collectives in the district managed to fulfill the 10th-month grain procurement target. The district, a model in the agricultural transformation movement, also took the lead in grain procurement in Hau Giang.

Prompted by the drum rolling in Thanh An village announcing the beginning of the grain delivery festival, every other locality in Hau Giang Province has held its own festival in the current 10th-month crop season to procure grain at an unprecedented pace. Although it still faces many difficulties regarding containers, storage facilities, means of transportation and cash, Hau Giang Province is resolutely striving to overfulfill the state-established grain procurement target of 280,000 tons in 1981.

CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

HANOI VIEWS COOPERATIVIZATION IN MEKONG DELTA

BK141500 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 QFT 13 Mar 81

[Text] According to a VNA report, late last year and early this year provinces in the former Nam Bo continued to consolidate and develop their cooperativization movement along with accelerating production of the 10th-month and winter-spring crops.

Many provinces have urged and encouraged their districts and villages to thoroughly study the contents and objective of the party Central Committee secretariat directive No 93/CTTU in order to formulate plans to strengthen and develop the cooperativization movement. A number of localities have made great effort in supervisory work and in drawing experiences from advanced collective production models. They have simultaneously carried out the tasks of developing and consolidating cooperativization along with the tasks of eliminating shortcomings and developing production which resulted in winning the people's confidence in the party line of agricultural cooperativization.

In the 10th-month and winter-spring crops this year, almost all production collectives have gained a high yield. As a result, collective members' income and collective accumulations have gradually increased, thus enabling them to overfulfill their grain obligation. In the recent 10th-month crop, more than 430 out of 720 advanced collective models yielded from 3 to 4 tons of paddy per hectare, while almost all advanced collective models and cooperatives fulfilled their plan norms of 5 tons per hectare in the winter-spring crop.

However, the cooperativization movement in provinces of the former Nam Bo has not been proportionately carried out. Some 60 percent of the total number of districts have neither carried out this task nor established production collectives.

Although provinces in the Mekong River delta cover a vast area, land used for cooperativization amounts to only 5 percent. Meanwhile, the elimination of various forms of feudal exploitation, hired farm land and rural bourgeoisie have been carried out slowly. Improvement of variances in land and ricefields to create favorable conditions for peasants to move toward a collective path have not been properly done. The training of cadres has been slow and proper attention has not been paid to establishing a contingent of capable cadres for the cooperativization movement.

CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

'NHAN DAN' ARTICLE ADVOCATES 'FOOD BELT' FOR HANOI

BK130930 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 13 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Van Dat of the Institute of Food Industry: "Establish a Food Belt Around Hanoi"—passages in slantlines denote bold face as published]

[Text] Since early 1979, Hanoi has been expanded to 2,122.80 square kilometers with a population of 2.5 million or more, including 788,000 in the urban area and 1.778 million in the suburban area. Of this figure, more than 1 million are workers and civil servants of various agencies and factories of the central government in Hanoi. The supply of grain and food to such a concentration of population is a heavy task for the municipal grain and food sector. The problem is to urgently establish a sufficient food belt in order to provide for and gradually improve the people's livelihood.

The experiences of many developed countries have indicated that the establishment of food belts around the major cities has brought positive economic results. It spares the cost of shipping foodstuffs from distant areas, prevents a deterioration of food commodities during the process of shipment and preservation and reduces the required storage space, the cost of building storage facilities, storage charges, and so forth.

In many countries, the areas surrounding cities are immense belts of greenery where herds of thousands of oxen and sheep graze and where livestock and poultry farms are concentrated. Hanoi has 11 suburban districts extending over 2,000 square kilometers or more. With their traditional experiences in raising animals and cultivating crops and with their varying soil and weather conditions, these districts can be developed into a strong and perfect food belt.

/Develop the Production and Processing of Grain and Food/

/Meat and Fish/: According to initial statistical reports, each person in Hanoi now can get only an annual average of 5 or 6 kg of meat (mainly pork and chicken) and 10 kg of fish. Efforts should be made so that by 1985 each person will get 10 kg of meat annually. This means that we must have from 25 to 30 million kg of meat--equivalent to 40,000 tons of pork on the hoof or 400,000 hogs (100-kilo hogs). It is therefore necessary to vigorously develop pig and chicken raising on a large scale in various state farms and agricultural cooperatives while at the same time stimulating the sideline family-based economy.

If we want to vigorously accelerate animal raising, especially the collective raising of pigs and chickens, we must quickly develop feed processing installations in localities. Each district needs to promptly build one or two factories to produce mixed feed while improving the quality and efficiency of feed. It is necessary to make full use of large quantities of industrial and agricultural by-products in Hanoi such as wine dregs, sugarcane bagasse, bran and sauce residue. Moreover, we should develop the planting of subsidiary food crops for animal raising such as corn in Dan Phuong and Phuc Tho districts, manioc in Ha Vi District and potato in Dong Anh and Thanh Tri districts. This calls for prompt action to resolve the problem of seeds and breeds. Hanoi is still short of breeding hogs and is still raising inferior breeds. We must gradually improve the herds of pigs, quickly secure a good system of breeds and select and rapidly increase the herds of sows. To insure the steady development of pig herds, we must intensify the veterinary tasks. We must quickly establish a veterinary network in villages and cooperatives according to the territorial division of districts, carry out the epidemiologic prevention and control tasks well and strive to minimize losses in animal husbandry.

Each person in Hanoi now gets only 9 or 10 kg of fish annually. This ration must be increased to 15 kg in 1985, which means that we must have a fish production of from 35,000 to 40,000 tons. Therefore, we must strongly develop the movement of building "Uncle Ho's fish ponds," increase fish productivity in the large Suoi Hai, Dai Lai, Ho Tay, Thuyen Quang and Lenin Park lakes, and expand the movement of fresh water fish raising in low-lying areas following the experiences of the Yen So co-operative in Thanh Tri District. The To Lich and Kim Nguu rivers, when they are improved, can be a good ground for fish raising.

/Vegetables/: Each person in Hanoi now gets approximately 70 to 80 kg of assorted vegetables annually. In the harvest season there is rarely a shortage of vegetables. However, the supply of vegetables has met only two-thirds of the demand because we have planted vegetables on only 7,000 hectares. We should expand the area of specialized vegetable cultivation in Gia Lam, Dong Anh, Thanh Tri and Tu Lien districts. Those vegetables with a high yield--namely water bindweed, cabbage, carrots, kohlrabi, and so forth--must be planted.

It is best to eat fresh vegetables reaped on time and quickly distributed for consumption. Moreover, it is necessary to carefully develop the processing of vegetables in families (brining of cabbages and eggplants) and on a large industrial scale (pickling, dehydration, pulverization and conservation in sauces) in order to have sufficient vegetables for consumption in the pre-harvest periods (from 15 March to 25 May and from 15 September to 15 November every year). We must not waste vegetables in bumper harvest seasons. We must quickly expand the Tuong Rai vegetable processing factory, build and commission the Gia Lam fruit and vegetable processing factory and build one or two more such factories, while completing the construction of the Gia Lam research station for vegetable planting (being built with Bulgarian aid) in order to create high-yielding and all-season varieties of vegetables.

The traditional practices of Hanoi people in planting and processing those vegetables used to produce spices (onion, garlic, fresh pepper and aromatic plants) must be promptly restored and developed in order to quickly bolster the diet of residents in the capital.

/Some Vital Measures/

The establishment of a food belt around the capital involves several sectors and calls for the participation of several agencies of the central government, but mainly of Hanoi City. We proposed the following vital measures:

--To establish area plans for raw materials.

Since we do not have much land and manpower and have to fulfill the requirements of building various projects for the state and the municipal administration in order to enlarge the capital, the formulation of area plans for the capital in general and for crop cultivation in particular so as to establish a food belt must be scientifically computed and accurately estimated.

In each district, depending on the geological and weather conditions we should establish area plans for the specialized cultivation of rice, vegetables and secondary food crops and for animal raising in order to insure the fulfillment of the immediate and long-term requirements for developing the capital in combination with the development of each district's strengths in terms of traditional experiences in crop cultivation and animal raising.

--To formulate the policies on prices and two-way contracts.

It is necessary to make a proper study to specifically apply the published state policies to the conditions of the capital in order to stimulate crop cultivators and animal raisers. These policies concern the grain obligations, the selling of animal raising products at agreed-upon prices, the two-way contracts and the prices for purchasing some kinds of products must be better implemented in the few coming years. Experiences show that once receiving a stable source of grain supply, the people in the areas of specialized vegetable cultivation will be freed of worries and work better and there will no longer be a situation in which rice is planted on vegetable land and pigsties are left empty. The supply of tools, chemical fertilizer and insecticide to the rice and vegetable areas, which has been thus far assumed by the Hanoi agricultural material supply corporation with a great deal of efforts, must be better organized in the coming years. The scope of two-way contracts should be specifically stated and carefully computed based on realistic potentials. It is necessary to increase the prices of some agricultural supplies in order to stimulate producers.

--To build new factories.

In the coming few years, the construction of factories to process food, fruits and vegetables in various suburban districts must be carried out in accordance with the following guidelines: factories must be built close to the areas of raw materials in order to reduce the cost of shipments and to secure sufficient raw materials for all the year round production. The factories must be mainly of medium and small sizes. The factories must use manual labor and semi-mechanized facilities and be provided with locally manufactured equipment and a capital sufficiently large to defray expenses for electricity, gas and water. Only by doing so, can the factories be built quickly with some economic results. The idea of perfection and the tendency toward modernization must be avoided at present. Experiences show

that the mechanization of the production process for some specific food commodities has not always brought about high economic results, if such commodities can still be produced by manual labor and semi-mechanized methods.

--To conduct scientific and technical research.

Scientific and technical research in all economic fields must always be performed some time ahead. As regards the still young Hanoi agricultural product processing sector, these tasks should be even more carefully accelerated. Technology should be promptly made a direct productive force worthy of its key position in the three revolutions in our country. We must promptly restore the functions of the technical offices of the agricultural and industrial services and the Hanoi fruit and vegetable corporation in conducting research and disseminating scientific and technical information. The Hanoi Sciences and Techniques Committee should be consolidated so that it can better carry out its scientific and technical tasks and ever more closely cooperate with the research institutes of the ministry of grain and food and of agriculture and with various universities located in the capital in order to study subjects concerning animal breeds, crop varieties, industrial regulations on the processing of new commodities and on the use of discarded materials and by-products, and the training of technical cadres and skilled workers, and so forth.

CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

SRV IMPROVES MANAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

OW150803 Hanoi VNA in English 0709 GMT 15 Mar 81

[Text] Hanoi, 15 Mar (VNA)--A new system of agricultural management in which work is assigned directly to each member of the cooperative has been widely applied in northern provinces for the current rice crop.

The old method used in agricultural cooperatives in northern Vietnam involved paying farmers according to workpoints they accumulated during the course of the crop. The workpoints represented the amount of time spent at work and the type of work done. Under the new system, plots of land are allotted directly to families of co-op members who, in return, will supply a certain quantity of produce, as previously determined by the production team, to the cooperative. On these plots, the cooperative is responsible for seed supply, plowing, irrigation, pest control, while farmers do other work such as rice planting, crop tending and harvesting. After the harvest, besides receiving a proportion of the crop--in cash or in kind--allocated by the cooperative according to their workpoints, farmers will retain 100 percent of what they produce over their pre-determined quota. If they fail to meet the target they will be fined the full equivalent of the shortfall.

The most significant feature of this system compared with the old is that it more directly links the interests and responsibilities of farmers to their final products. This has encouraged them to make full use of the productive capacities of their families, land and fertilizers, and to strictly observe improved farming methods and apply technical innovations in production.

The new method of management was initiated by some agricultural cooperatives on Haiphong's outskirts. The city's party committee and people's committee studied it carefully and applied it widely in the 1980 winter rice crop. Farmers were elated at this method because the cooperatives obtained higher output while co-op members' incomes improved. Moreover, the quantity of rice sold to the state by cooperatives exceeded planned targets. Almost 5,000 farmers, who had left their land for small trading, voluntarily returned to production. The number of administrative cadres in agricultural cooperatives of the four suburban districts fell by 20 percent. More than 2,000 hectares of newly reclaimed land were put under rice. As a result, in spite of severe weather conditions, Haiphong's rice output last year was four per cent higher than in 1976--its best ever.

Early this year, the Ministry of Agriculture organized a conference of leading officials in charge of agricultural production from all northern cities and provinces to study Haiphong's experiences. The purpose of the conference was to bring together a wide range of experiences in agricultural management in order to review the shortcomings of past policies in the light of the success experienced by those cooperatives which were applying the new system. The conference concluded that the old system failed to adequately reward those farmers who used their work-time most effectively, thereby discouraging the full development of their productive potential. It strongly recommended the adoption of the new principles in order to give each farmer a more direct interest in efficiently maximizing production.

The secretariat of the Communist Party Central Committee has issued a directive on the application of this new managerial system. "When applying this new method," the directive stresses, "due attention must be paid to the management of productive forces and the use of tractors, draught animals, fertilizers and other material and technical resources of the cooperatives in order to boost production and prevent all activities incompatible with the principles of socialist collectivization."

In the current spring rice crop, the new system has been applied by almost all cooperatives in northern cities and provinces. As a result, rice planting has been completed from 10 to 15 days ahead of schedule. In Nghe Tinh Province, where rice planting was often delayed in the past, the area planted with spring rice has been expanded by 1.4 percent to an unprecedented level.

Drawing on the experiences of various localities, responsible state offices and relevant bodies are working out a complete set of new principles of management which is expected to be applied soon in other areas of work in agricultural cooperatives in the northern part of the country.

CSO: 4220

POPULATION, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

SENDING OF PEOPLE TO NEW ECONOMIC ZONE TO BE IMPROVED

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 13 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by Vuong Tuoc: "In 1981, Motivate and Organize Better People Being Sent to Hanoi's New Economic Zone in Lam Dong"]

[Text] Implementing the resolution adopted at the Eighth Congress of Municipal Party Organization Delegates and carrying out the goals set by the Municipal People's Committee in the 1980 plan about motivating and organizing people to be sent to build Hanoi's new economic zone in Lam Dong Province, the city has by 22 December 1980 sent 16 groups of people there totaling 462 households, 3,269 people and 2,187 laborers, surpassing the plan goal by 9.5 percent.

From the above results the following experience has been drawn:

- One, the Municipal VCP and People's Committees were very determined and made many resolutions and decisions about building the new economic zone. The city acted on its own initiative without passively waiting while the Central Committee had yet to adopt a perfected policy about building new economic zones in the southern provinces.

Many party committee echelons and administrations at the basic, ward and district levels showed vigorous changes in their determination to assume leadership over sending people to the new economic zone. Typical were Dan Phuong, Phuc Tho, Tu Liem and Gia Lam Districts and Ba Dinh and Hoan Kiem Wards.

Many municipal sectors, such as the Labor, Communications and Transportation, Commerce, Finance and Banking Services, also showed their greater concern and actually coordinated their activities closely and effectively in carrying out the policies and procedures for organizing labor and households to be sent to the new economic zone. The committees for mobilizing people for the new economic zone at all levels, municipal to ward and district, also changed their leadership formula by considering the village and subward level as the key one for their

work; their cadres clung to the movement, worked closely with and assisted the households and created favorable conditions for them to feel assured as they left for the zone.

• Two, in 1980 attention was paid to the quality of sending people to the new economic zone as people were screened relatively carefully to ensure the right percentage of working people and to turn down cases of sickness, complicated situation, criminal background, etc. On the other hand, attention was also paid to mobilizing the families having members being party or youth union members (30 families having party members and 87 youth union members were mobilized).

On the basis of the experience of previous years, in 1980 the city sent away three large groups only, at the right time during the crop seasons so as to allow the people to quickly settle down and to start production right away. After the first crop they were able to harvest it and thus to ensure their own living.

• Three, in spite of very many difficulties, the Municipal VCP and People's Committees boldly took money from local budget to finance construction work and gave priority to materials, equipment, new high-yield rice varieties, etc., thus quickly creating favorable conditions for building the material and technical base in the new economic zone for the people to stay on a long-term basis.

The city also boldly sent to the new economic zone cadres from different sectors, recruited a number of village cadres into the staff and strengthened the ranks of backbone cadres in the cooperative's management. On the other hand, it paid attention to providing the people with means, seeds and capital and letting them borrow land in order to speed up production and to stabilize their living conditions.

Another important thing was the fact that all wards, districts and cities set up and used new economic zone funds to support the people being sent there to reduce their difficulties. According to incomplete data, so far the wards and districts have mobilized 282,865 dong and 26,870 kilograms of paddy. Dan Phuong District spent 200 dong for each household going to the new economic zone to build a house and 100 dong and 200 kilograms of paddy on each individual going there. Phuc Tho District gave each individual 100 dong and 3 months' supply of grain for him to wait for the harvest. Other units like Thach That, Hoai Duc, Gia Lam, Tu Liem, Hoan Kiem, Ba Dinh and Hai Ba Trung also set up their own new economic zone funds and assisted the people who were leaving, as well as supported the cooperative in the new economic zone to ensure good results.

In 1981 Hanoi will send about 1,000 households, 2,500 laborers and 5,000 people to the Lam Dong new economic zone.

In order to attain the above goals we must quickly strengthen the ranks of cadres and send additional households there so as to allow new cooperatives to take shape (one for every 100-150 households).

- We must continue and urgently set up additional new economic zone funds in all localities and use them. These cooperatives' funds are mainly set up with the people's contributions, with the people's committees of the wards and districts determining their form and size and appropriate contributions depending on the particular situation of their own locality. As to small industrial and handicraft cooperatives, the central and local enterprises can urge them to increase their production and to work beyond the hours required by the plan. Currently, do not seek contributions from cadres, workers and civil servants in the staffs of organs and enterprises.

- In 1981, with the permission of the Municipal VCP and People's Committees, the Municipal New Economic Zone Committee, along with the Labor Service and Municipal Youth Union Chapter, will coordinate activities to mobilize and organize on an experimental basis four vanguard youth companies of four urban wards to be sent there to support construction of the new economic zone so as to gain experience in extending this activity to other units.

5598

CSO: 4209

BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Hoàng Thọ Am [HOANG THOJ AM]

*Deputy Director of the Urban Projects Service, Hanoi; his comments on traffic safety hazards appeared in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 7 Jan 81 p 4)

Nguyễn Ngọc Anh [NGUYEENX NGOCJ ANH], *Lt Col and Engineer

Author of an article in this issue entitled, "Being Master of Modern Weapons and Ordnance at Air Defense Group B61." (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 11, Nov 80 pp 52-58)

Lý Thái Bảo [LYS THAIS BAOR]

Director of the Central Newsreel and Documentary Film Enterprise [Xi nghiep phim Thoi su Tai lieu Trung uong]; headed a delegation of the Vietnam Motion Picture Association that attended an international conference on "Anti-Fascist Motion Pictures" held in Weimar, GDR from 1 to 4 September 1980. (DIE ANH No 5-6, Nov-Dec 80 p 63)

Đậu Thế Biểu [DAAUJ THEES BIEEUR]

*Head of the Party Building Department [Khoa Xay dung Dang] of the Nguyen Ai Quoc Higher Party School; he is the author of a research article in this issue entitled, "Some General Features of Building Socialism by Leading and Ruling Parties." (TAP CHI GIANG VIEN No 6, Nov-Dec 80 pp 25-34 & 38)

Nguyễn Thanh Bình [NGUYEENX THANH BINHP]

On 23 January 1981 he was relieved as Minister of Water Conservancy. (HANOI MOI 23 Jan 81 p 4)

Trương Quý Bình [TRUONG QUYS BINHP]

Head of the Vietnam-Cuba [Friendship] Hospital; his comments on treatment of patients in his hospital appeared in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 15 Jan 81 p 4)

Trịnh Văn Bính [TRINH VAWN BINHS]

Vice Minister of Finance; is shown as signer of Directive No 32-CT/LB of the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank, dated 26 December 1962, concerning the issuance of budget capital for unit and organ estimated needs; and of Decision No 03-TC/TDT of the Ministry of Finance, dated 30 March 1972, which promulgates an estimated unit accounting system—both of which are printed in this volume.

(Hanoi LAP VA CHAP HANH NGAN SACH NHA NUOC [Formulating and Executing State Budgets], Su That, 1978 pp 24, 232 & 266)

Bùi Văn Các [BUIF VAWN CACS]

Vice Minister of Building; he is the author of an article in this issue entitled, "Struggle to Complete Successfully the Construction and Installation Task for 1980 and Make Good Preparations for This Task During the First Quarter of 1981." (XAY DUNG No 12, Dec 80 pp 2-3 & 10)

Vũ Văn Căn [VUX VAWN CAANR]

Minister of Public Health; his letter expressing appreciation for the awarding of the Ho Chi Minh Medal 1st Class to the Public Health Sector appeared in the cited source. (SUC KHOE 5 Jan 81 pp 1, 6)

Nguyễn Văn Cẩn [NGUYEENX VAWN CAWNG]

*Deputy chief of the International Cooperation Department [Vu Hop tac Quoc te], State Science and Technology Commission; he is the author of an article in this issue entitled, "The Well-Developed S&T Cooperation," to commemorate the 25th anniversary of USSR-SRV economic cooperation. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC No 8, Aug 80 pp 1-2)

Nguyễn Bá Cẩn [NGUYEENX BAS CAANR]

Director of the Public Health Service, Hanoi; on 30 December 1980 he accepted a citation for merit on behalf of the Hanoi public health sector. (HANOI MOI 31 Dec 80 p 1)

Nguyễn Chấn [NGUYEENX CHAANS]

On 23 January 1981 he was relieved as Minister of Power and Coal and appointed *Minister of Mines and Coal. (HANOI MOI 25 Jan 81 p 4)

Đặng Việt Châu [DAWNGJ VIEETJ CHAAU]

On 23 January 1981 he was appointed *Minister in the Office of the Premier. (HANOI MOI 25 Jan 81 p 4)

Đặng Ngọc Chiêu [DANGJ NGOCJ CHIEU]

*Chief of the Culture and Information Service of Hai Hung Province; this issue prints an interview with him on culture and information activities in his province during the past 25 years. (VAN HOA NGHE THUAT No 12, Dec 80 pp 17-18)

Đường Quốc Chính [ZUOWANG QUOCJ CHINH]

Minister of War Invalids and Social Welfare; on 31 December 1980 he spoke at the 3rd Conference of Delegates of Hanoi Retirees. (HANOI MOI 1 Jan 81 p 1)

Đỗ Chính [DOOX CHINH]

On 23 January 1981 he was relieved as Minister of Maritime Products. (HANOI MOI 25 Jan 81 p 4)

Nguyễn Côn [NGUYEENX COON]

Deputy Director of the Commerce Service, Hanoi; his interview concerning commercial activities in Hanoi appeared in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 3 Jan 81 p 3)

Phạm Như Cường [PHAMJ NHUW CUWONG], Prof

Head of the Institute of Philosophy of the Vietnam Social Science Commission and editor-in-chief of the Institute's quarterly journal TRIET HOC; headed the SRV delegation that attended the Tenth Conference of Philosophy Institute Heads of Socialist Country Academies of Science held in Prague from 9 to 12 September 1980. (TRIET HOC No 4, Oct-Dec 80 p 166)

Nguyễn Cảnh Dinh [NGUYEENX CANHR ZINH]

On 23 January 1981 he was appointed *Minister of Water Conservancy. (HANOI MOI 25 Jan 81 p 4)

Quảng Văn Dinh [QUANG VAWN ZINH]

*Deputy Head of the Education Service, Lai Chau Province; his reply to a complaint appeared in the cited source. (NGUOI GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 10 Dec 80 p 2)

Nguyễn Xuân Du [NGUYEENX XUAAN ZU]

*Chairman of the People's Committee, Hoa Duc District, Hanoi; his letter concerning location of brick and tile kilns in his district appeared in the cited source. (HA NOI MOI 31 Dec 80 p 4)

Võ Chí Long [VOX CHIS ZUNGX]

*Chief of the Culture and Information Service of Tay Ninh Province; this issue prints an interview with him on culture and information activities in his province during the past 25 years. (VAN HOA NGHE THUAT No 12, Dec 80 p 19)

Trần Dũng [TRAAN ZUNOWNG]

Deputy Director of the State Bank; is listed as one of two signers of Directive No 32-CT/LB of the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank, dated 26 December 1962, concerning the issuance of budget capital for unit and organ estimated needs, which is printed in this volume. (Hanoi LAP VA CHAP HANH NGAN SACH NHA NUOC [Formulating and Executing State Budgets], Su That, 1978 pp 232 & 266)

Hoàng Trọng Đại [HOANGF TRONGJ DAIJ]

Vice Minister of Foreign Trade; on 23 January 1981 he signed a trade agreement in Hanoi, on behalf of the SRV, with Mongolia. (HANOI MOI 24 Jan 81 p 1)

Vũ Đại [VUX DAIJ]

On 23 January 1981 he was appointed Minister and Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission. (HANOI MOI 25 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Đáng [NGUYEENX DANGS]

Alternate Member of the VCP Central Committee; Secretary of the VCP Committee; Cuu Long Province; recently he accompanied General Secretary Le Duan on a visit to his province. (HANOI MOI 16 Jan 81 p 1)

Lê Tấn Đạt [LEE TAANS DAIJ]

*Acting Chairman of the People's Committee, Cuu Long Province; recently he accompanied General Secretary Le Duan on a visit to his province. (HANOI MOI 16 Jan 81 p 1)

Phan Xuân Đột [PHAN XUAAN DOWTJ]

On 23 January 1981 he was appointed *Minister of Forestry. (HANOI MOI 25 Jan 81 p 4)

La Lâm Gia [LA LAAN GIA]

On 23 January 1981 he was appointed *Minister of Food. (HANOI MOI 25 Jan 81 p 1)

Lê Hà [LEE HAF]

*Director of the Hanoi Federation of Import-Export Corporations [Lien hiep cong ty Xuat nhap khau Hanoi]; his interview on Hanoi's foreign trade appeared in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 24 Jan 81 p 3)

Nguyễn Triều Hải [NGUYEENX TRIEEU HAIR]

*Deputy Director of the Education Service, Hanoi; on 21 January 1981 he reported on tree planting activities by the education sector during the past 20 years. (HANOI MOI 23 Jan 81 p 1)

Phạm Thế Hiền (PHAM THEE HIENF)

Deputy Director of the Industry Service, Hanoi; his interview concerning industrial activities in Hanoi appeared in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 7 Jan 81 p 3)

Trần Văn Hiền (TRAANF VAWN HIEENR)

On 23 January 1981 he was relieved as Minister of Home Trade. (HANOI MOI 23 Jan 81 p 1)

Phạm Kim Hỷ (PHAM KIM HYR)

*Vice President of the Hanoi Women's Association; on 16 January 1981 she was elected to that position. (HANOI MOI 17 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Kha (NGUYEENX KHA)

*Head of the Science and Technology Committee of Phu Khanh Province; he is the author of an article on the successful harvest by Dien An Cooperative in Phu Khanh Province. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC No 8, Aug 80 pp 11-14)

Phạm Khai (PHAM KHA1)

On 23 January 1981 he was appointed *Minister of Electric Power. (HANOI MOI 23 Jan 81 p 4)

Trần Đăng Khoa (TRAANF DAWNG KHOA)

Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly; on 6 January 1981 he attended a reception by the Palestine Liberation Organization in Hanoi. (HANOI MOI 7 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Đăng Khối (NGUYEENX DAWNG KHOOI)

Editorial Secretary of TAP CHI SINH VAT HOC (Biology Review), the quarterly journal of the Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name appears on the masthead of the publication. (TAP CHI SINH VAT HOC Vol 2, No 3, Aug 80 masthead)

Trần Kiên (TRAANF KIEEN)

On 23 January 1981 he was relieved as Minister of Forestry. (HANOI MOI 23 Jan 81 p 4)

Vũ Kiên (VUX KIEEN)

Head of the Political Department, Ministry of Public Health; on 30 December 1980 he presented a citation for merit to the Hanoi public health sector. (HANOI MOI 31 Dec 80 p 1)

Hoàng Kim [HOANGF KIM], Senior Colonel

*Political Officer, Capital Military Region; his article "Developing Collective Mastery Among Youths of Military Units" appeared in the cited source. (HANOI NOI 10 Dec 80 p 2)

Hà Kinh [HAF KINH]

*Chief of the Culture and Information Service of Ha Son Binh Province; this issue prints an interview with him on cultural activities in his province during the past 25 years. (VAN HOA NGHIE THUAT No 12, Dec 80 pp 16-17)

Nguyễn Lan [NGUYENX LAN]

Secretary of the VCP Central Committee; Vice Premier; on 6 January 1981 he attended a reception by the Palestine Liberation Organization in Hanoi. (HANOI NOI 7 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Sĩ Lâm [NGUYENX SIX LAAM]

President of the Vietnam Association of Oriental Medicine; attended the recent Fourth Congress of the Hanoi Association of Oriental Medicine. (TAP CHI DONG Y No 168, Nov-Dec 80 p 26)

Lê Văn Lãm [LEE VAM LAAM]

*Deputy chief of the Institute for Scientific Research in Sports and Physical Education [Vien Nghien suu Khoa hoc The duc The thao]; he is the author of an article in this issue entitled, "The Scientific Basis for the Training of Sportsmen and Gymnasts." (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC No 11-12, Nov-Dec 80 pp 14-16 & 22)

Nguyễn Thành Lê [NGUYENX THANH LEE]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; Head of the Foreign Relations Department of the Central Committee of the VCP; on 16 January 1981 he attended a reception for a delegation of the Communist Party of India-Marxist. (HANOI NOI 17 Jan 81 p 1)

Đinh Nho Liêm [DINH NHO LIEM]

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; on 22 January 1981 he attended the arrival in Hanoi of the Burmese Minister of Foreign Affairs. (HANOI NOI 23 Jan 81 p 1)

[Đặng] Đức Lộc [DANGJ DUOC LOOCJ]

Standing Member of the VCP Committee, Hanoi; recently he accompanied Central Committee Member and Hanoi VCP Deputy Secretary Le Quang Dao on a visit to Thanh Tri District. (HANOI NOI 27 Jan 81 p 1)

Minh Lộc (MINH LOOC)

*Head of the Scientific Socialism Department (Khoa Chu nghĩa Xã hội Khoa học) of Branch 5 (Phan hiệu V) of the Nguyen Ai Quoc Higher Party School; he is the author of an article on management work in his department. (TAP CHI GIANG VIEN No 6, Nov-Dec 80 pp 39-41)

Nguyễn Trung Mai (NGUYENX TRUNG MAI)

Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; on 10 January 1981 he attended a meeting of the municipal communications and transportation sector to discuss plans for 1981. (HANOI NOI 13 Jan 81 p 1)

Hoàng Trường Minh (HOANGX TRUONGX MINH)

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; Secretary of the VCP Committee, Lang Son Province; on 28 December 1980 he attended a conference of the Lang Son Province Women's Association. (PHU NU VIETNAM 7-13 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Ngọc Minh (NGUYENX NGOCX MINH)

Chief of the Institute of Jurisprudence of the Vietnam Social Science Commission and editor-in-chief of the Institute's quarterly journal LUAT HOC; his name appears on the masthead of the publication. (LUAT HOC No 3, Jul-Sep 80)

Trần Thị Thục Nga (TRANGX THIX THUCX NGA)

*President of the Hanoi Teachers College No 1; her comments concerning assignment procedures for graduates of her school appeared in the cited source. (HANOI NOI 10 Dec 80 p 4)

Hoàng Thị Nhân (HOANGX THIX NHAN)

Vice President of the Hanoi Women's Association; on 8 January 1981 she attended the 7th Congress of Delegates of the Hanoi Women's Association. (HANOI NOI 9 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Thị Nhung (NGUYENX THIX NHUNG)

Standing Member of the VCP Committee, Hanoi; *President of the Hanoi Women's Association; on 16 January 1981 she was elected to the latter position. (HANOI NOI 17 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Thị Như' (NGUYENX THIX NHU')

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; Vice Chairman of the Vietnam-Kampuchea Friendship Association; on 6 January 1981 she attended activities in Hanoi marking the 2nd anniversary of the liberation of Kampuchea. (HANOI NOI 7 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Niên [NGUYENX NIEEN]

Editorial Secretary of LUAT HOC, the quarterly journal of the Institute of Jurisprudence of the Vietnam Social Science Commission; his name appears on the mast-head of the publication. (LUAT HOC No 3, Jul-Sep 80)

Hoàng Oanh [HOANGF OANH]

*Vice President of the Hanoi Women's Association; on 16 January 1981 she was elected to that position. (HANOI NOI 17 Jan 81 p 1)

Lưu Hữu Phước [LIUW HUMIX PHUWOCES]

Chairman of the Culture and Education Committee of the National Assembly; on 24 January 1981 he attended the awarding of Ho Chi Minh Medal First Class to the Culture and Information Sector. (HANOI NOI 25 Jan 81 p 4)

Trần Phóng [TRAANF PHUWONG]

On 23 January 1981 he was relieved as Minister and Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission and appointed *Minister of Home Trade. (HANOI NOI 25 Jan 81 p 1)

Phan Trọng Quang [PHAN TRUNGJ QUANG]

*Head of the Vietnam Film Materials Institute [Vien Tu lien Phim Viet Nam] formed "almost 1 year ago"; mentioned in an article on this new institute in this issue. (DIEN ANH No 5-6, Nov-Dec 80 p 42)

Nguyễn Hữu Quảng [NGUYENX HUMIX QUANG]

*Chief of the Department for the Preservation of Historical Antiquities [Vu bao ton bao tang di tích lịch sử]; attended ceremonies organized in Hanoi on 28 July by the Ministry of Culture and Information for the designation of a temple in Hanoi as an historical monument. (TAP CHI DONG Y No 167, Sep-Oct 80 p 30)

Hà Thị Quế [HAF THIJ QUEES]

Member of the VCP Central Committee; former President of the Vietnam Women's Confederation; on 8 January 1981 she attended the 7th Congress of Delegates of the Hanoi Women's Federation. (HANOI NOI 9 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Duy Quế [NGUYENX ZUY QUEES]

*Director of the Scientific and Technical Publishing House; he is the author of an article in this issue on the activities of the publishing house during the past 20 years. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC No 11-12, Nov-Dec 80 pp 20-22)

Lê Quý [LEE QUYS]

Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Vietnam Broadcasting and Television Commission; on 12 January 1981 he was scheduled to speak at the Retirees Club in Hanoi on

Vice Premier Vo Nguyen Giap's recent visit to Africa. (HANOI MOI 10 Jan 81 p 4)

Trương Thị Quý (TRUONG THI QUY)

*Vice President of the Hanoi Women's Association; on 16 January 1981 she was elected to that position. (HANOI MOI 17 Jan 81 p 1)

Trần Quỳnh (TRAN QUYNH)

On 23 January 1981 he was relieved as Minister and Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission and designated *Vice Premier. (HANOI MOI 25 Jan 81 p 1)

Lê Sinh Tạng (LEE SINH TANG)

Director of the Agriculture Service, Hanoi; his article "For 1981 the Agriculture Sector Strives to Achieve the Plan's Principle Goals" appeared in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 10 Jan 81 p 2)

Lê Kinh Tề (LEE KINH TE)

*Director of the Vegetable and Fruit Export-Import Corporation; on 13 January 1981 he was scheduled to appear on Hanoi television. (HANOI MOI 13 Jan 81 p 4)

Nguyễn Cơ Thạch (NGUYENX CO THACH)

Minister of Foreign Affairs; on 22 January 1981 he attended the arrival in Hanoi of the Burmese Minister of Foreign Affairs. (HANOI MOI 23 Jan 81 p 1)

Đặng Ngọc Thanh (DANGX NGOC THANH), Prof and PhD

Deputy chief of the Vietnam Institutes of Science and publisher of the Institutes' biology journal TAP CHI SINH VAT HOC; he is the author of an article in this issue on 35 years of growth and development of the Vietnamese biology sector. (TAP CHI SINH VAT HOC Vol 2, No 3, Aug 80 p 1 and masthead)

Hồ Việt Thắng (HUO VIEETS THANGS)

On 23 January 1981 he was relieved as Minister of Food. (HANOI MOI 25 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Thị Thập (NGUYENX THI THAP)

Member of the VCP Central Committee; Honorary President of the Vietnam Women's Confederation; on 8 January 1981 she attended the 7th Congress of Delegate of the Hanoi Women's Federation. (HANOI MOI 9 Jan 81 p 1)

Lê Tiến Thịnh (LEE TIENS THINH), *Sr Col

Author of an article in this issue entitled, "Maintaining Reserves of Sources for Material Goods for Troop Messing." (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 11, Nov 80 pp 18-24)

Nguyễn Đức Thọ (NGUYỄN ĐỨC THỌ)

*Vice President of the Vietnam Table Tennis Association; Director of the Physical Education and Sports Service, Hanoi; on 2 January 1981 he headed a table tennis team that left to compete in India. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Jan 81 p 4)

Nguyễn Thọ (NGUYỄN THỌ)

Director of the Vietnam Movie Enterprise [Xi nghiệp Phim truyền Việt Nam]; mentioned in a brief in this issue about activities at the enterprise. (DIEN ANH No 5-6, Nov-Dec 80 p 61)

Đặng Văn Tấn (ĐẶNG VĂN TẤN), *Col

Author of an article in this issue entitled, "New Step in Troop Recruiting Work in Military Region 9." (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 12, Dec 80 pp 57-63)

Lê Anh Trà (LÊ ANH TRÀ)

*Acting chief of the Institute of Research on Art History and Theory [Viện Nghiên cứu Lý luận Lịch sử Nghệ thuật]; spoke with a delegation from the USSR Ministry of Culture that visited the Institute in May 1980. (NGHIEN CUU NGHỆ THUẬT No 4, Jul-Aug 80 p 92)

Lê Trần (LÊ TRẦN)

Editor-in-Chief of the children's weekly newspaper THIEU NIEN THIEN PHONG; on 12 January 1981 he conducted a viewing of photos and sketches made by correspondents of his newspaper who served in Kampuchea. (HANOI NOI 13 Jan 81 p 1)

Lê Xuân Trinh (LÊ XUÂN TRINH)

*Head of the Short Term Plan Formulating Department [Vu Tong hop ke hoach ngan han], State Planning Commission; on 15 January 1981 he spoke to the Municipal VCP Committee on implementation of the 1980 State Plan and the orientation of the 1981 State Plan. (HANOI NOI 18 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Tiến Trinh (NGUYỄN TIẾN TRINH)

On 23 January 1981 he was appointed *Minister of Maritime Products. (HANOI NOI 25 Jan 81 p 4)

Hoàng Anh Tuấn (HOANG ANH TUẤN)

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; on 22 January 1981 he attended the arrival in Hanoi of the Burmese Minister of Foreign Affairs. (HANOI NOI 23 Jan 81 p 1)

Vũ Tuấn (VŨ TUẤN)

On 23 January 1981 he was relieved as Minister in the Office of the Premier in order to become *Minister of Food Industry. (HANOI NOI 25 Jan 81 p 1)

Hoàng Tùng [HOANG TUNG]

Member of the VCP Central Committee; Head of the Propaganda and Training Department of the VCP Central Committee; on 12 January 1981 he attended the departure of a delegation of the Propaganda and Training Department of the Central Committee of the Lao Revolutionary People's Party. (HANOI NOI 13 Jan 81 p 1)

Trần Danh Tuyên [TRANH DANH TUYEN]

Deputy Head of the Foreign Relations Department of the VCP Central Committee; on 10 January 1981 he spoke before the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity and Friendship with People of Other Nations and the Vietnam-Cuba Friendship Association concerning the just completed 2nd Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba. (HANOI NOI 11 Jan 81 p 1)

Phan Văn Uyên [PHAN VAN UYEN]

*Deputy Head of the Education Service, Dac Lac Province; he was mentioned in an article about efforts to eliminate illiteracy in his province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 1 Jan 81 p 3)

Hai Vi [HAI VI]

Vice Minister of Culture and Information; on 26 January 1981 he signed, on behalf of the SRV, a protocol with the GDR on cooperation in the fields of publications and motion pictures. (HANOI NOI 27 Jan 81 p 1)

Chu Viên [CHU VIEEN]

Chairman of the People's Committee, Thanh Tri District, Hanoi; his interview on vegetable production in his district in 1980 appeared in the cited source. (HANOI NOI 20 Jan 81 p 3)

Vũ Đình Việt [VUX DINH VIEETJ]

Chairman of the Vietnam Marketing Cooperatives Management Board; on 20 January 1981 he attended a reception for a delegation of the All India Cooperatives Federation. (HANOI NOI 22 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Anh Vũ [NGUYENX ANH VUX]

*SRV Ambassador to Italy; on 26 December 1980 he attended the 4th Congress of the Association of Vietnamese Residents in Italy for Solidarity marking the adoption of a new constitution by the SRV. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Jan 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Quang Xá [NGUYENX QUANG XAS]

*Minister; chairman of the State Economic Arbitration Council; headed the Vietnamese delegation that attended the 9th conference of state arbitration leaders of member nations of CEMA held in Varna, Bulgaria from 6 to 10 October 1980. (LUAT HOC No 3, Jul-Sep 80 p 41)

Nguyễn Trọng Xuân [NGUYEENX TRONGJ XUAAN]

*Acting chief of the Press and Publication Department [Cuc Xuat ban va Bao chi] of the Ministry of Culture and Information; he is the author of an article in this issue on press and publication activities in Vietnam during the past 25 years. (VAN HOA NGHE THUAT No 12, Dec 80 pp 14-15)

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